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INTRODUCTION This	  project	  convened	  a	  dialogue	  between	  civil	  societies	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa	  (RSA)	  to	  deepen	  understanding	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  each	  nation	  views	  its	  most	  critical	  strategic	  security	  concerns	  and	  the	  domestic	  debates	  that	  shape	  those	  views.	  This	  project	  engaged	  in	   dialogue	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   nuclear	   disarmament,	   energy,	   and	   proliferation/nonproliferation	  issues.	  Despite	  cooperation	  on	  a	  number	  of	  matters	   in	   this	  area,	  U.S.-­‐South	  African	  relations	  have	  not	  always	  been	  cordial	  and	  the	  two	  have	  come	  into	  open	  disagreements	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions.	  South	   Africa	   is	   a	   key	   force	   for	   regional	   stability	   in	   Africa.	   It	   maintains	   an	   active	   and	   expanding	  nuclear	   energy	   industry,	   is	   an	   influential	   country	  within	   the	   African	   Union	   (AU),	   has	   the	   largest	  economy	  on	  the	  continent	  of	  Africa,	  and	  maintains	  the	  most	  well-­‐equipped	  and	  trained	  military	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa.	   In	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   narrative	   “United	   States-­‐South	   Africa	   Relationship:	  Going	  Global”1	  the	  question	  is	  how	  the	  two	  countries	  can	  improve	  their	  cooperation	  and	  decrease	  tension	  in	  this	  area	  for	  greater	  global	  security.	  To	   promote	   dialogue	   on	   these	   issues,	   in	   September	   2013,	   Drs.	   Jessica	   Piombo	   of	   the	   Naval	  Postgraduate	  School	  and	  Joelien	  Pretorius	  of	  the	  University	  of	  the	  Western	  Cape	  facilitated	  a	  two-­‐day	  workshop,	  entitled	  Perspectives	  on	  Security,	  Disarmament,	  and	  Nonproliferation:	  Views	  from	  the	  
United	  States	  and	  South	  Africa.	  The	  event	  brought	  together	  sixteen	  participants	  to	  discuss	  how	  they	  perceived	  each	  country’s	  views	  on	  a	  set	  of	  issues	  related	  to	  nuclear	  nonproliferation,	  disarmament,	  nuclear	  energy,	  and	  international	  cooperation	  on	  nuclear	  and	  nonproliferation	  issues.	  Participants	  included	  high-­‐level	  officials	   from	  the	  United	  Nations	  Office	  for	  Disarmament	  Affairs	  (UNODA)	  and	  Comprehensive	  Nuclear-­‐Test	   Ban	   Treaty	   Organization	   (CTBTO)	   and	   South	   African	   and	   American	  academic	   institutions	   and	   think	   thanks	   that	   focus	   on	   nuclear	   and	   nonproliferation	   issues	   and	  international	   relations.	   Additionally,	   observers	   attended	   from	   the	   South	   African	   Department	   of	  International	  Relations	  and	  International	  Cooperation	  (DIRCO)	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Pretoria.	  	  Despite	   perceptions	   that	   the	   United	   States	   and	   South	   Africa	   are	   far	   apart	   in	   terms	   of	  international	   engagement	   on	   nuclear	   nonproliferation	   and	   disarmament	   issues,	   the	   workshop	  discussion	   illuminated	   that	   cooperation	   exists	   on	   multiple	   issues	   along	   several	   dimensions,	   and	  highlighted	   that	   the	   two	   countries	   tend	   to	   be	   in	   agreement	   on	   the	   same	   general	   goals.	   Areas	   of	  cooperation	  include	  mutual	  dedication	  to	  nonproliferation	  and	  bilateral	  support	  for	  the	  associated	  nonproliferation	  and	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  (WMD)	  security	  treaties	  and	  conventions.	  There	  are,	  nonetheless,	  significant	  areas	  in	  which	  there	  are	  differences	  in	  basic	  outlook	  and	  orientation,	  as	  well	   as	   ways	   of	   engaging	   in	   international	   fora	   that	   affect	   the	   extent	   of	   collaboration	   and	   the	  development	  of	  a	  closer	  relationship.	  Basic	  principle	  disagreements	  included:	  conditionality	  about	  which	  countries	  can	  acquire	  nuclear	  energy	  and	  weapons	  and	  which	  cannot;	  fissile	  material	  –	  cutoff	  of	   future	  production	  versus	  elimination	  of	  existing	  stocks;	   the	  prioritization	  and	  weighting	  of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Hillary	  Clinton,	  Speech	  presented	  at	  the	  University	  of	  the	  Western	  Cape,	  August,	  8	  2012,	  http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/08/196184.htm.	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three	  pillars	  of	  nonproliferation;	   and	   country-­‐specific	  differences	   in	   the	  means	   to	  achieve	   similar	  ends.	   Disagreement	   also	   existed	   on	   the	   lexicon	   used	   during	   the	   discussion;	   differing	   definitions	  associated	   with	   words	   can	   impede	   cooperation.	   For	   example,	   “nuclear	   fissile	   material	   cutoff”	   is	  interpreted	  by	   some	   as	   prohibition	   of	   future	   production	   and	  by	   others	   as	   elimination	   of	   existing	  stock.	  Additionally,	  at	  times,	  issues	  of	  human	  and	  stretched	  resources	  mean	  that	  South	  Africa	  does	  not	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  respond	  to	  all	  of	  the	  issues	  on	  which	  United	  States	  counterparts	  seek	  input	  and	  action.	  	  Broad	  consensus	  exists	  that	  the	  time	  is	  ripe	  to	  pursue	  greater	  engagement	  and	  cooperation	  on	  many	  nonproliferation	  and	  disarmament	  fronts.	  Participants	  at	  the	  workshop	  revealed	  a	  sense	  that	  the	   right	   team	   is	   in	   place	   under	   the	   Obama	   administration	   to	   make	   progress	   across	   the	  nonproliferation	  agenda.	  Also,	  many	  noted	  that	  the	  shift	  to	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  orientation	  under	  the	  administration	  of	  President	  Zuma	  has	  improved	  relations	  and	  collaboration	  between	  the	  countries.	  Pursuing	  a	  closer	  relationship	  therefore	  becomes	  a	  matter	  of	  political	  will	  at	  the	  Principals	  level—including	  the	  administrations	  in	  both	  countries.	  Care	  will	  have	  to	  be	  taken,	  however,	  as	  the	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Africa	  have	  very	  distinct	  international	  constituencies	  that	  they	  keep	  in	  mind	  when	  engaging	  on	  nonproliferation	  and	  disarmament	  issues.	  	  Trust	  and	  mistrust,	  on	  both	  sides,	   is	  an	  additional	  issue	  that	  can	  curtail	   increased	  cooperation	  and	   engagement.	   More	   public	   diplomacy	   may	   be	   necessary	   to	   reverse	   the	   negative	   perceptions	  stemming	   from	   the	   establishment	   of	   United	   States	   Africa	   Command	   (AFRICOM),	   military	  intervention	  in	  Libya,	  and	  the	  perceived	  securitization	  of	  U.S.-­‐Africa	  policy.	  Within	  RSA,	  there	  is	  also	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  language	  used	  when	  the	  United	  States	  describes	  its	  international	  position.	  Across	  the	  board,	  attendees	  felt	  that	  the	  Track	  2	  venue	  is	  a	  productive	  form	  of	  engagement.	  The	  unofficial	   environment	   is	   important	   for	   sharing	   information	   and	   perspectives,	   and	   airing	  differences	   in	   a	  non-­‐charged	  environment.	   Furthermore,	   the	  process	   itself	   is	   valuable	   to	  building	  communities	   of	   interest	   since	   discussions	   takes	   place	   at	   the	   academic	   level,	   not	   at	   the	   level	   of	   a	  basic	  briefing	  or	  statement	  of	  policy	  position.	  It	  also	  allows	  discussion	  of	  principles,	  philosophical	  issues,	   and	  differences	  while	  promoting	  advanced	  dialogue	  and	  higher-­‐level	   analysis	  more	  useful	  than	  basic	  discussion.	  	  	  
WORKSHOP FINDINGS IN BRIEF 1. Despite	   perceptions	   that	   the	   United	   States	   and	   South	   Africa	   are	   far	   apart	   in	   terms	   of	  international	   engagement	   on	   nuclear	   nonproliferation	   and	   disarmament	   issues,	   the	   two	  countries	  actually	  cooperate	  on	  many	   issues,	  along	  multiple	  dimensions,	  and	  agree	  on	  the	  same	  general	  goals.	  2. The	  time	  is	  ripe	  to	  pursue	  greater	  engagement	  and	  cooperation	  on	  many	  nonproliferation	  and	  disarmament	  fronts.	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3. There	  are,	  nonetheless,	  significant	  areas	  in	  which	  there	  are	  differences	  in	  basic	  outlook	  and	  orientation,	  as	  well	  as	  ways	  of	  engaging	   in	   international	   fora,	   that	  will	  affect	   the	  extent	  of	  collaboration	  and	  the	  development	  of	  a	  closer	  relationship.	  4. The	  U.S.-­‐South	  African	  “trust	  deficit”	  is	  a	  result	  of	  both	  historical	  and	  current	  drivers.	  	  5. There	  is	  a	  strong	  need	  for	  additional	  capacity	  building	  within	  South	  Africa	  on	  nuclear	  issues,	  nonproliferation,	  and	  disarmament.	  	  6. Across	   the	   board,	   the	   participants	   agreed	   that	   the	   dialogue/workshop	   venue	   can	   be	   a	  productive	  form	  of	  engagement.	  	  
  
SESSION HIGHLIGHTS 
Session	  One:	  Global	  and	  Regional	  Security	  –	  Views	  from	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  United	  States	  Presenters	   were	   asked	   to	   focus	   on	   both	   countries’	   global	   and	   regional	   strategic	   perspectives,	  including	   the	   contexts	   in	  which	   these	   have	   developed	   since	   1994,	   perceived	   security	   challenges,	  global	   relations,	   foreign	   and	  defense	   policies,	   relations	  with	   regional	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	  AU,	  and	   future	   directions	   including	   South	   Africa	   within	   the	   Brazil-­‐India-­‐China-­‐South	   Africa	   (BRICS)	  grouping	   and	  Non-­‐Aligned	  Movement	   (NAM)	   contexts.	   The	   session	   presentations	   and	   discussion	  highlighted	  the	  following	  issues.	  	  	  
• U.S.	   foreign	   policy	   in	   Africa	   is	   based	   on	   five	   pillars:	   1)	   democracy	   and	   democratization;	   2)	  support	  of	  economic	  growth;	  3)	  conflict	  prevention	  and	  resolution;	  4)	  support	  for	  presidential	  initiatives;	  5)	  working	  with	  Africans	  on	  transnational	  issues.	  
• U.S.	   strategic	   concerns	   often	   override	   its	   rhetorical	   commitments,	   evidenced	   by	   support	   for	  security	  allies	  such	  as	  Nigeria,	  Rwanda,	  and	  Ethiopia,	  even	  when	  their	  actions	  contravene	  U.S.	  stated	  support	  for	  democracy	  and	  democratization.	  The	  tensions	  between	  rhetorical	  principles	  and	  strategic	  interests	  characteristic	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  Africa	  and	  continue	  to	  create	  trust	   issues	  among	  South	  African	  and	  other	  continental	   leaders.	   If	  South	  Africa	   is	   to	  be	  a	   true	  partner	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  then	  it	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  an	  equal,	  rather	  than	  a	  client	  state.	  
• South	  Africa	   is	  geostrategically	   important	  to	  U.S.	   foreign	  policy	  and	  is	  recognized	  as	  a	  capable	  partner,	   anchor	   state,	   and	   regional	   hegemon.	   However,	   the	   lack	   of	   direct	   threats	   places	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  as	  a	  relatively	  low	  priority	  overall.	  African	  issues	  have	  risen	  in	  importance	  since	  the	   initiation	   of	   the	   Global	  War	   on	   Terror	   in	   2001,	  which	   has	   created	   a	   perception	   that	   U.S.	  policy	   towards	   Africa	   has	   become	   “securitized.”	   Continental	   leaders	   point	   out	   the	   armed	  intervention	   in	   Libya,	   threat	   of	   military	   force	   in	   Syria,	   continued	   high	   levels	   of	   assistance	  provided	  to	  Egypt,	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  military	  support	  to	  Uganda	  as	  examples.	  This,	   in	  turn,	  has	  somewhat	  soured	  the	  U.S.-­‐South	  Africa	  relationship.	  	  
• South	   Africa	   has	   used	   the	   last	   decade	   to	   redefine	   its	   foreign	   policy	   aspirations	   of	   global	   and	  regional	   leadership.	  South	  Africa	  views	  itself	  as	  a	  middle	  power	  that	  uses	   international	   law	  to	  pursue	  its	  national	  interests	  within	  the	  continent	  and	  globally.	  It	  also	  positions	  itself	  as	  a	  leader	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within	  Africa	  and	  participation	   in	  BRICS,	   the	  Group	  of	  Twenty	  (G20),	  and	  as	  a	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	   (UNSC)	  non-­‐permanent	  member	  has	   strengthened	  South	  Africa’s	   continental	  leadership	  role.	  This	  frequently	  brings	  RSA	  national	  interests	  in	  conflict	  with	  those	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  continent.	  South	  Africa	  considers	  negotiation	  and	  compromise,	   rather	   than	  direct	  military	  action,	   as	   the	   best	   methods	   to	   solve	   deep	   seated	   problems.	   This,	   at	   times,	   brings	   it	   into	  disagreement	   with	   the	   United	   States	   over	   ways	   to	   manage	   conflict	   and	   other	   international	  issues.	  	  
• Taking	   into	  consideration	  economic	  concerns	  and	  the	  African	  National	  Congress	  (ANC’s)	  stain	  of	   corruption,	   South	   Africa	   needs	   to	   shift	   its	   focus	   from	   foreign	   policy	   to	   domestic	   issues	   in	  order	  for	  South	  Africa	  to	  sustain	  its	  global	  and	  regional	  leadership	  role.	  	  	  
Session	  Two:	  Nuclear	  Deterrence	  and	  Disarmament	  Considerations	  Presenters	  were	  asked	  to	  reflect	  on	  how	  the	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Africa	  each	  prioritize	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  (WMD),	  nuclear	  weapons	  proliferation	  and	  disarmament,	  nuclear	  security,	  and	  deterrence	   concerns	   in	   their	   respective	   strategic	   outlook;	   how	  U.S.	   nuclear	   has	   posture	   changed;	  what	  each	  country’s	  sensitivities	  are	  related	  to	  nuclear	  disarmament;	  and	  how	  each	  country	  views	  Nuclear	  Weapons	   Free	   Zones	   (NWFZs)	   and	   a	   Nuclear	  Weapons	   Convention	   (NWC).	   The	   session	  presentations	  and	  discussion	  focused	  on	  the	  following	  points.	  	  	  
• South	  Africa	  and	  the	  United	  States	  maintain	  fundamentally	  different	  perceptions	  on	  matters	  of	  national	  security	   that	   influence	   their	  positions	  on	  nuclear	  disarmament,	  nonproliferation,	  and	  the	  peaceful	  use	  of	  nuclear	  technology.	  
• South	  Africans	  tend	  to	  adopt	  a	  regional	  and	  multilateral	  interest	  in	  and	  attitude	  to	  international	  issues.	   This	   approach	   contrasts	   many	   of	   the	   methods	   of	   the	   United	   States:	   the	   global	   reach,	  tendency	   towards	   unilateral	   action,	   and	   focus	   on	   bilateral	   relations	  with	   individual	   countries	  rather	  than	  working	  through	  international	  institutions.	  
• The	   U.S.	   government	   is	   concerned	   with	   nuclear	   proliferation	   by	   outlier	   radical	   states	   and	  violent	  extremist	  organization	   that	  have	  access	  or	  prospective	  access	   to	  nuclear	  material	   and	  could	   threaten	   global	   security.	   This	   informs	   its	   stance	   on	   several	   states	   that	   seek	   to	   acquire	  nuclear	  energy	  technology,	  such	  as	  Iran.	  In	  contrast,	  South	  Africa	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  right	  to	  have	  nuclear	  technology	  for	  all	  countries	  that	  seek	  it,	  and	  is	  concerned	  that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  using	  its	  stated	  concern	  with	  radical	  states	  to	  prevent	  others	  from	  accessing	  nuclear	  technology.	  
• While	   both	   countries	   pursue	   goals	   of	   nonproliferation	   and	   disarmament,	   the	   United	   States	  prioritizes	   preventing	   an	   increase	   in	   nuclear	   weapons-­‐possessing	   states	   while	   South	   Africa	  emphasizes	   promoting	   a	   nuclear	   weapons-­‐free	   world	   (i.e.,	   disarming	   the	   current	   nuclear	  weapons	  possessing	  countries).	  
• South	   Africa	   sees	   the	   existence	   of	   nuclear	   weapons	   as	   the	   m a i n 	   problem,	   and	   draws	   few	  distinctions	  among	  possessor	  states.	   For	   the	   United	   States,	   the	  principal	   concern	   is	  who	  has	  the	   weapons	   and	   the	   security	   challenges	   stemming	   from	   possession	   by	   states	   viewed	   as	  irresponsible,	  dangerous,	  or	  hostile.	   South	  Africa	  objects	  to	  what	  it	  sees	  as	  this	  U.S.	  rejection	  of	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“universality”	   in	   nonproliferation	   and	   disarmament.	   In	   particular,	   South	   Africa	   is	   highly	  troubled	   that	   the	   United	   States	   openly	   accepts	   Israeli	   and	   Indian	   possession	   of	   nuclear	  weapons	  but	  actively	  seeks	   to	   limit	   the	  ability	  of	  other	  states	   to	  acquire	  civil	  nuclear	  energy.	  This	   is	   a	   critical	   difference	   between	   states,	   and	  can	  prevent	  movement	  on	  joint	  initiatives.	  To	  the	  South	  Africans,	  a	  world	  of	  peace	  requires	  no	   nuclear	  weapons.	  	  
Session	  Three:	  Views	  on	  Nuclear	  Nonproliferation	  and	  Peaceful	  Uses	  In	  this	  session,	  we	  asked	  the	  presenters	  to	  assess	  how	  each	  country	  perceives	  the	  nonproliferation	  regime,	   expansion	   of	   nuclear	   energy,	   the	   nuclear	   export	   regime	   and	   counter-­‐proliferation	  measures,	   e.g.,	   the	   Proliferation	   Security	   Initiative	   (PSI).	   Remarks	   were	   centered	   on	  nonproliferation	  and	  peaceful	  uses	  of	  nuclear	  energy,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  relationship	  among	  the	   three	  pillars	  of	  the	  Nonproliferation	  Treaty	  (NPT).	  The	  session	  presentations	  and	  discussion	  focused	  on	  the	  issues	  below.	  	  	  
• U.S.	   policy	   is	   viewed	   as	   focused	   disproportionately	   on	   nonproliferation	   compared	   to	  disarmament	   and	   energy	   issues.	   South	   Africans	   see	   evidence	   of	   changing	   U.S.	   rhetoric	  towards	  some	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  Global	  Zero	  movement,	  but	  actions	  are	  seen	  as	  falling	  far	  short	  of	  meaningful	  progress	  and	  are	  therefore	  viewed	  with	  disappointment.	  
• RSA	  maintains	  that	   it	  has	  not	  been	  recognized	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  for	   its	  significant	  progress	  in	  implementing	  nonproliferation	  agreements	  and	  restoring	  trust.	  South	  Africa	  has	  made	   its	   intentions	   clear	  by	  dismantling	  of	   the	  nuclear	  weapons	  program	  and	   joining	   the	  international	  binding	  obligations:	  it	  has	  been	  to	  the	  dark	  side	  and	  now	  it	  is	  ready	  to	  reap	  the	  benefits.	  
• South	  Africa	  supports	  Article	   IV	  of	   the	  NPT	  as	  ensuring	   the	   inalienable	  right	   to	  a	  peaceful	  nuclear	  energy	  program.	  While	  South	  Africa	  calls	  on	  NAM	  countries	  to	  exercise	  this	  right,	  it	  simultaneously	   calls	   on	  North	  Korea	  and	   Iran	   to	  dismantle	  nuclear	  weapons	  or	  weapons-­‐related	  activities	  and	  adhere	  fully	  to	  the	  NPT	  and	  International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Association	  (IAEA)	  inspection	  requirements.	  
• There	  was	  agreement	  that	  the	  permanent	  five	  members	  (P5)	  of	   the	  UNSC	  and	  NAM	  states	  both	  want	  the	  same	  ends.	  There	  is	  less	  distance	  between	  the	  respective	  American	  and	  South	  African	   interpretations	   of	   the	   “peaceful	   use”	   provisions	   of	   NPT	   Article	   IV	   than	   is	   often	  assumed.	  Both	   interpret	  the	  right	  to	  “peaceful	  use	  of	  nuclear	  energy”	  as	  conditioned	  upon	  compliance	   with	   NPT	   Articles	   I,	   II,	   and	   III.	   Other	   countries	   place	   more	   emphasis	   on	   the	  “inalienable	  right”	  clause	  in	  Article	  IV	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  right	  pertains	  irrespective	  of	  other	  compliance	  concerns	  (eg,	  Iran).	  This	  close	  U.S.-­‐South	  Africa	  agreement	  is	  reflected	  in	  voting.	  South	  Africa	  votes	  with	  the	  United	  States	  in	  favor	  of	  sanctions	  against	  Iran	  even	  when	  this	  places	  South	  Africa	  at	  odds	  with	  its	  NAM	  allies.	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Session	  Four:	  U.S.	  and	  South	  African	  Domestic	  Political	  Interests	  Relating	  to	  
Nonproliferation,	  Arms	  Control,	  and	  Disarmament	  Issues	  In	   this	   session,	  we	   asked	   the	   speakers	   to	  discuss	   a	   range	  of	   domestic	   considerations	   that	   inform	  public	   policy	   on	  nonproliferation,	   arms	   control,	   and	  disarmament	   issues,	   including	   the	   input	   and	  role	  of	  civil	  society,	  and	  domestic	  politics	  and	  legislative	  processes.	  The	  session	  presentations	  and	  discussion	  raised	  the	  following	  issues.	  	  	  
• Our	  speakers	  presented	  a	  set	  of	  themes	  that	  were	  common	  to	  both	  the	  U.S.	  and	  South	  Africa:	  
§ The	  publics	  in	  both	  countries	  are	  relatively	  disengaged	  from	  nuclear,	  nonproliferation,	  and	  disarmament	  policy.	  
§ Active	   lobby	   groups,	   sponsored	   by	   the	   nuclear	   industry	   in	   each	   country,	   are	   the	   most	  engaged	  non-­‐governmental	  groups	  in	  the	  policy	  process.	  
§ In	  both	  countries	  there	  exists	  a	  small,	  engaged	  set	  of	  civil	  society	  groups	  that	  oppose	  both	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  energy.	  These	  constitute	  the	  public	  voice	  of	  opposition	  in	  the	  place	  of	  general	  information,	  knowledge,	  and	  interest	  in	  nuclear	  issues.	  
• In	  both	  countries,	  policy	  related	  to	  nuclear	  nonproliferation,	  disarmament,	  and	  peaceful	  energy	  tends	   to	   be	   formulated	   at	   the	   executive/administrative	   level,	  with	   little	   input	   from	   society	   at	  large,	   significant	   input	   from	   industry	   lobby	   groups,	   and	   moderate	   (USA)	   to	   minimal	  constructive	  input	  (RSA)	  from	  civil	  society.	  	  
• South	   African	   policies	   are	   guided	   by	   a	   sense	   of	   principles	   (particularly	   related	   to	   nuclear	  disarmament	   and	   the	   unequivocal	   right	   to	   nuclear	   energy	   and	   technology	   for	   peaceful	  purposes),	  while	  U.S.	  policies	   tend	   to	  drive	   from	  a	   sense	  of	  pragmatism	  and	  national	   security	  interests.	  This	  can	  be	  a	  source	  of	  divergence	  in	  the	  policy	  stances	  and	  international	  outlooks	  of	  each	  country.	  
• A	  key	  difference	   in	   the	  domestic	  politics	  of	  nuclear	  nonproliferation	  and	  disarmament	  across	  the	  two	  countries	  related	  to	  how	  internal	  politics	  within	  the	  national	  legislatures	  affects	  nuclear	  policy	   in	   each	   country.	   The	   U.S.	   Congress	   is	   somewhat	   independent	   and	   engages	   with	   the	  administration,	   while	   in	   South	   Africa	   the	   Parliament	   is	   relatively	   quiet	   on	   these	   issues.	   The	  dominance	  of	  the	  ANC	  in	  the	  South	  African	  Parliament	  makes	  for	  a	  relatively	  unified	  approach	  to	  nuclear,	  nonproliferation,	  and	  disarmament	  issues,	  which	  eases	  the	  passage	  of	  key	  legislation	  and	  treaty	  ratification.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  divisions	  between	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  within	   the	  Republican	  Party,	  mean	   that	   the	  U.S.	  Congress	   tends	   towards	  gridlock	  on	  the	  ratification	  of	  international	  treaties	  and	  other	  nonproliferation	  initiatives.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  divisions	  between	  and	  within	  the	  two	  parties	   in	  the	  United	  States	  affect	   legislation	  and	  international	  policies	  is	  a	  point	  that	  the	  Americans	  in	  the	  group	  felt	  that	  South	  Africans	  often	  do	  not	  understand.	  	  
Session	  Five:	  Identifying	  Areas	  of	  Mutual	  Interest	  Here,	  we	  posed	  a	  set	  of	  questions	  that	  asked	  the	  speakers	  and	  participants	  to	  consider	  what	  issues	  the	   United	   States	   and	   South	   Africa	   generally	   agree	   are	   short	   and	   long-­‐term	   opportunities	   and	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challenges	   in	   nonproliferation,	   arms	   control,	   and	   disarmament.	  What	   competing	   priorities	   affect	  the	   range	   of	   issues	   in	   which	   the	   countries	   agree?	   How	   can	   the	   United	   States	   and	   South	   Africa	  further	   promote	   and	   enhance	   the	   implementation	   of	   United	   Nations	   Security	   Council	   Resolution	  (UNSCR)	  1540	  in	  line	  with	  the	  January	  2013	  AU	  Assembly	  Decision	  (Assembly/AU/Dec.472)?	  The	  session	  presentations	  and	  discussion	  highlighted	  the	  following	  points.	  	  	  
• Both	   states	  want	   a	   nuclear	  weapons-­‐free	  world,	   but	   disagree	   on	   the	  means	   to	   the	   end.	   Both	  sides	  agreed	  that	  there	  is	  a	  shared	  interest	  in	  working	  to	  obtain	  positive	  outcome	  at	  the	  2015	  NPT	  Review	  Conference	  (RevCon).	  
• The	  United	  States	  recognizes	  that	  South	  Africa	  is	  the	  most	  important	  and	  able	  actor	  in	  Africa	  in	  the	   nuclear	   arena	   and	   has	   demonstrated	   its	   nonproliferation	   commitment	   and	   leadership	   in	  numerous	  ways	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  Non-­‐participation	  by	  members	  of	  the	  Global	  South,	  including	  South	  Africa,	  is	  frequently	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  capacity	  rather	  than	  non-­‐compliance.	  	  
• Despite	  a	  perception	  that	  the	  countries	  tend	  to	  be	  far	  apart	  on	  these	  issues,	   the	  presentations	  and	  discussion	  both	  noted	  that	  extensive	  multilateral	  and	  bilateral	  collaboration	  does	  exist	  on	  a	  variety	   of	   issues,	   especially	   safety	   and	   security,	   nonproliferation	   proofing	   measures,	   and	  capacity	   building.	   Multilateral	   examples	   include	   the	   IAEA	   safeguards,	   NPT	   (including	   the	  Additional	   Protocol	   [AP]),	   Comprehensive	   Test	   Ban	   Treaty	   (CTBT),	   Chemical	   Warfare	  Convention	   (CWC),	   Biological	  Warfare	   Convention	   (BWC),	   and	   the	  African	  Nuclear	   Free	   Zone	  Treaty	   (Treaty	   of	   Pelindaba).	   Bilateral	   efforts	   to	   combat	   global	   terrorism	   and	   the	   spread	   of	  WMD	  were	  highlighted	  including	  the	  investigations	  and	  prosecutions	  of	  specific	  cases	  related	  to	  South	  Africans,	  the	  conversion	  of	  SAFARI-­‐1	  to	  low	  enriched	  uranium	  (LEU)	  fuel	  operations	  (and	  U.S.	   repatriation	   of	   6.3	   kgs	   highly	   enriched	  uranium	   [HEU]),	   security	   awareness	   and	  physical	  security	  improvements	  at	  nuclear	  facilities,	  health	  and	  safety,	  UNSCR	  1540	  implementation,	  and	  cooperation	   with	   other	   AU	   state	   reporting.	   Better	   communication	   and	   socialization	   of	   this	  record	  could	  also	  help	  reduce	  the	  U.S.-­‐South	  Africa	  “trust	  deficit”	  
• The	  presenters	  and	  participants	  felt	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  significant	  shift	  within	  the	  American	  administration	  on	  these	  issues.	  The	  change	  in	  tone	  from	  the	  Bush	  to	  the	  Obama	  administrations,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  committed	  team	  to	  work	  on	  nuclear	  disarmament	  and	  nonproliferation,	  represents	  a	   significant	   shift	   and	   has	   improved	   the	   U.S.-­‐RSA	   nuclear	   relationship.	   For	   example,	   South	  African	  participants	  called	  the	  current	  administration	  a	  “dream	  team”	  on	  nonproliferation	  and	  disarmament	  issues	  and	  highlighted	  the	  signaling	  of	  presidential	  declarations	  such	  as	  President	  Obama’s	  Prague	  speech,	  May	  2009.	  	  
Session	  Six:	  Looking	  to	  Areas	  of	  Misunderstanding	  and	  Disagreement	  In	  this	  session,	  the	  speakers	  and	  general	  discussion	  focused	  on	  the	  issues	  that	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  United	   States	   view	   differently.	   The	   speakers	   were	   asked	   to	   consider	   topics	   ranging	   from	   Iran,	  sanctions,	  the	  IAEA	  Additional	  Protocol,	  minimizing	  stocks	  and	  the	  civil	  use	  of	  HEU	  in	  lieu	  of	  LEU,	  or	  competing	  economic	  interests	  in	  nuclear	  technology,	  trade	  and	  the	  uranium	  market.	  They	  tailored	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their	   remarks	   based	   on	   the	   discussions	   held	   up	   to	   this	   point	   in	   the	   workshop.	   The	   session	  presentations	  and	  discussion	  highlighted	  the	  following	  issues.	  	  	  	  	  
• The	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Africa	  each	  frame	  and	  define	  their	  nuclear	  postures	  through	  their	  role	   in	   international	   politics	   and	   their	   national	   interests.	   Each	   country	   has	   a	   different	  international	  constituency	   that	   it	  keeps	   in	  mind	  when	  engaging	   in	   international	   fora,	  and	   this	  can	  lead	  to	  differences	  in	  approach,	  policy	  stance,	  and	  prioritization	  of	  various	  issues.	  As	  their	  nuclear	   relations	   are	   impacted	   by	   general	   foreign	   policy	   orientations,	   this	   can	   facilitate	  agreement.	   When	   these	   orientations	   are	   not	   properly	   appreciated,	   it	   more	   often	   leads	   to	  misunderstandings	  and	  disagreements.	  	  
• Many	   felt	   that	   the	  United	   States	   and	   South	  Africa	   interpret	   the	  NPT	  differently,	   and	   that	   this	  causes	   resentment	   from	   the	   South	  African	   side.	   The	   South	  Africans	   place	   equal	  weight	   on	   all	  three	   pillars	   of	   the	   NPT	   (nonproliferation,	   disarmament,	   and	   access	   to	   nuclear	   technology),	  while	  the	  United	  States	  focuses	  principally	  on	  nonproliferation.	  The	  South	  Africans	  felt	  that	  the	  United	   States	   undermines	   the	   NPT	   when	   it	   supports	   additional	   measures	   to	   prevent	   non-­‐nuclear	   weapon	   states	   (NNWS)	   from	   obtaining	   nuclear	   weapons	   (e.g.,	   the	   AP),	   but	   does	   not	  pressure	   U.S.	   allies	   who	   already	   possess	   them	   to	   disarm.	   For	   the	   United	   States,	   both	   sides	  agreed	   that	   disarmament	   seems	   optional	   and	   aspirational	   (rather	   than	   a	   genuinely	   pursued	  goal),	  and	  the	  United	  States	  seems	  to	  pursue	   it	   through	  a	  series	  of	  bilateral	  relationships	   that	  are	  conducted	  outside	  the	  context	  of	   the	  NPT.	  This	   last	  part	   is	  a	  significant	   issue	  to	   the	  South	  Africans,	   as	   they	   feel	   it	  undermines	   the	  multilateralism	  of	   the	  NPT,	   circumvents	   international	  law	   (as	   the	   NPT	   is	   legally	   binding),	   and	   leads	   to	   an	   issue	   of	  what	   they	   perceived	   as	   double-­‐standards	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
§ Related	  to	  this,	  there	  was	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  U.S.	  tendency	  to	  consider	  some	  countries	  “good”	  and	   “bad”	   proliferators.	   Several	   South	   Africans	   noted	   that	   just	   using	   these	   terms	   was	  offensive	  and	  paternalistic,	  while	  also	  serving	  as	  an	  additional	  example	  of	  how	  the	  U.S.	  has	  double	  standards.	  To	  the	  South	  Africans,	  all	  countries	  should	  disarm,	  and	  there	   is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  “good”	  or	  “bad”	  proliferator.	  The	  notion	  that	  some	  countries	  could	  be	  trusted	  with	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  others	  not	  comes	  across	  as	  paternalistic	  and	  politicized,	  in	  the	  South	  African	  view.	  	  
• Although	  some	  disagreements	  are	  intractable	  policy	  orientations,	  there	  was	  a	  sense	  that	  other	  differences	  and	  misunderstandings	  also	  boil	  down	  to	  distrust	  between	  the	  two	  based	  on	  history	  and	  current	  international	  politics.	  
§ For	  example,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  at	  times	  labeled	  South	  Africa	  as	  a	  “proliferation	  concern”	  and	  maintains	  some	  suspicion	  about	  RSA’s	  remaining	  HEU	  stock,	  its	  ability	  to	  safeguard	  its	  nuclear	  facilities	  and	  material,	  and	  the	  potential	  that	  South	  Africa	  may	  seek	  to	  acquire	  the	  full	  fuel	  cycle	  again.	  	  On	  their	  side,	  the	  South	  Africans	  noted	  that	  they	  feel	  their	  disarmament	  and	  nonproliferation	  credentials	  should	  place	  the	  country’s	  intentions	  above	  suspicion.	  
§ Confidence-­‐building	   mechanisms,	   including	   more	   Track	   1.5	   and	   2	   initiatives,	   and	   U.S.	  support	  for	  capacity	  building	  in	  South	  Africa	  can	  improve	  nuclear	  relations.	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Session	  Seven:	  Defining	  the	  Ideal	  Relationship	  Between	  the	  Two	  Countries	  In	   this	   panel,	   we	   sought	   to	   identify	   specific	   areas	   in	   which	   cooperation	   on	   disarmament,	  nonproliferation,	  counter-­‐proliferation,	  and	  nuclear	  energy	  could	  be	  enhanced.	  The	  speakers	  were	  asked:	  in	  an	  ideal	  world,	  how	  would	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  United	  States	  relate	  to	  one	  another?	  The	  discussion	  raised	  the	  following	  issues.	  	  	  
• When	   assessing	   the	   relationship	   based	   on	   shared	   values	   and	   ideals,	   the	   U.S.-­‐South	   Africa	  bilateral	  relationship	  should	  be	  as	  close	  as	  that	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Australia	  or	  New	  Zealand.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   commonalities	   between	   the	   two	   countries	   far	   outweigh	   the	  differences,	  and	  therefore	  should	  frame	  the	  official	  relationship.	  In	  reality,	  however,	  the	  speaker	  argued	  that	  the	  current	  official	  relationship	  lacks	  warmth	  and	  is	  often	  “edgy.”	  On	  both	  sides	  the	  relationship	   is	   distorted	   by	   suspicion	   and	   disappointments,	   each	   with	   historical	   roots.	   As	   a	  result,	   the	   partnership	   remains	   underdeveloped.	   Nuclear	   issues	   could	   provide	   an	   avenue	   to	  generate	  closer	  relations,	  due	  to	  South	  Africa’s	  unique	  credibility	  on	  disarmament.	  
• Additionally,	   misunderstandings	   impede	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   closer	   relationship,	   so	   more	  efforts	   should	   be	   made	   by	   both	   sides	   to	   communicate	   more	   clearly	   about	   their	   capacity	   to	  respond	  to	  issues	  that	  the	  other	  prioritizes.	  For	  example,	  some	  of	  the	  South	  Africans	  mentioned	  that	   the	   U.S.	   policy	   community	   often	   perceives	   a	   lack	   of	   movement	   on	   U.S.	   initiatives	   as	  resistance	  to	  them,	  when	  in	  reality	  this	  often	  stems	  from	  a	  critical	  lack	  of	  capacity	  in	  the	  South	  African	   government.	   They	   felt	   that	   their	  U.S.	   counterparts	   did	  not	   sufficiently	   appreciate	   that	  the	  South	  African	  government	  simply	  does	  not	  have	  the	  personnel	  within	  DIRCO	  to	  prioritize	  all	  of	  the	  initiatives	  that	  the	  U.S.	  pressures	  South	  Africa	  to	  sign	  into,	  such	  as	  PSI.	  The	  South	  African	  policy	  representatives	  were	  very	  firm	  on	  this	  point,	  as	  were	  the	  U.S.	  embassy	  representatives:	  both	   felt	   that	   counterparts	   based	   in	   Washington	   do	   not	   sufficiently	   appreciate	   the	   human	  capacity	  constraints	  of	  the	  South	  African	  government.	  	  
• Both	   sides	   felt	   that	   there	   is	   a	   confluence	   between	   the	   U.S.	   and	   South	   African	   positions	   on	  nuclear	   energy	   and	   nonproliferation	   issues	   (as	   well	   as	   important	   differences)	   that	   could	   be	  better	   leveraged,	   pending	   an	   honest	   assessment	   of	   the	   areas	   of	   miscommunication	   and	  disagreement.	  Working	   these	   commonalities	   holds	   potential	   for	   improving	   the	   quality	   of	   the	  broader	  relationship	  between	  the	  countries.	  
• There	   could	   be	   great	   potential	   for	   unofficial	   efforts	   to	   complement	   official	   mechanisms	   and	  provide	  a	  conduit	  for	  bringing	  the	  two	  countries	  into	  a	  more	  cordial	  relationship.	  	  
Session	  Eight:	  Roundtable	  Discussion	  to	  Shape	  Future	  U.S.-­‐South	  Africa	  Workshops	  In	  this	  open	  floor	  discussion,	  the	  conveners	  of	  the	  workshop	  invited	  participants	  to	  raise	  and	  isolate	  key	  points	  discussed	  during	  the	  panels	  or	  consider	  areas	  of	  contention	  or	  agreement.	  We	  opened	  the	  floor	  for	  all	  participants	  to	  raise	  topics	  for	  future	  dialogues	  as	  well	  as	  propose	  ideas	  or	   issues	  not	  explored.	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• Across	   the	   board,	   participants	   valued	   the	   high	   level	   of	   academic	   interaction	   between	  nuclear	  subject	  matter	  experts,	  and	  between	  those	  experts	  and	  generalists	  in	  South	  African	  and	   international	   politics.	   The	   discussion	   began	   at	   the	   debate	   level	   with	   significant	  academic	  analysis	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  collective	  knowledge.	  	  
• There	   was	   agreement	   that	   the	   government	   and	   private	   sector	   practitioners	   tangibly	  involved	  in	  policy	  formulation	  and	  implementation	  should	  be	  stakeholders	  to	  guide	  future	  track	  two	  processes.	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  to	  share	  their	  perspectives,	  but	  also	  so	  that	  the	   next	   generation	   of	   policy	   personnel	   can	   benefit	   from	   the	   process	   of	   discussion	   and	  debate.	   It	  would	   be	   possible	   to	   turn	   the	   track	   two	  dialogue	   into	   an	   educational	   event	   for	  both	  countries’	  personnel.	  
• Participants	   also	   agreed	   that	   a	   lack	  of	   funding	   and	   resources	   is	   a	   genuine	   issue	   for	   South	  Africans	  that	  limits	  network	  formulation	  and	  travel	  interactions,	  especially	  outside	  of	  South	  Africa.	   To	   cultivate	   the	   relationships	   and	   network	   established	   at	   the	   dialogue,	   a	   low-­‐cost	  solution	  recommended	  was	  a	  mailing	  list	  or	  regular	  forum	  through	  e-­‐mail	  or	  the	  internet	  to	  disseminate	  scholarship.	  	  
• Students	   could	  be	  utilized	  as	  emerging	   representatives	  of	   the	  new	  generation	   to	   cultivate	  knowledge	  through	  participation.	  In	  both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Africa,	  the	  community	  of	   interest	   in	   nuclear	   weapons,	   disarmament,	   and	   nonproliferation	   issues	   is	   relatively	  homogenous.	   Therefore,	   efforts	   need	   to	   be	   made	   to	   diversify	   the	   communities	   in	   each	  country.	   Track	   two	   initiatives	   can	   help	   stimulate	   interest	   in	   these	   issues	   because	   the	  student	   can	   observe	   the	   debates	   and	   learn	   the	   language,	   terms,	   and	   process	   surrounding	  nuclear	  policy.	  Historically,	  South	  African	  students	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  pursuing	  a	  career	  in	  international	   relations	   or	   security	   studies,	   and	   these	   initiatives	   could	   generate	   interest.	  Additionally,	   the	   community	   of	   interest	   within	   both	   countries	   is	   not	   gender	   or	   racially	  diverse.	   Efforts	   to	   incorporate	   new	   groups	   into	   initiatives	   like	   unofficial	   dialogues	   could	  stimulate	  interest	  and	  help	  broaden	  the	  community	  of	  interest.	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BACKGROUND Africa	   has	   been	   rising	   in	   importance	   in	   U.S.	   security	   interests	   for	   over	   a	   decade.	   The	   U.S.	  government	   and	   international	   affairs	   and	   security	   experts	   have	   become	   increasingly	   concerned	  with	   a	   range	   of	   security	   issues	   in	   Africa,	   which	   include	   illicit	   trafficking,	   piracy	   and	   maritime	  security,	  the	  exploitation	  of	  sensitive	  minerals	  like	  uranium,	  and	  the	  future	  of	  the	  nonproliferation	  regime	  within	  Africa.	  While	  the	  United	  States	  has	  a	  broad	  system	  of	  educational,	  cultural,	  and	  other	  exchanges	   with	   African	   countries	   in	   the	   realms	   of	   development	   and	   governance,	   and	   strong	  diplomatic	  links	  in	  these	  areas,	  security-­‐focused	  exchanges	  are	  considerably	  more	  limited.	  	  	  The	   need	   for	   a	   civil	   society/academic	   driven	   U.S.-­‐South	   Africa	   dialogue	   is	   compelling.	   South	  Africa	   is	   a	   regional	   leader	   within	   Africa	   and	   the	   AU;	   it	   is	   an	   increasingly	   powerful	   global	   force	  (having	   recently	   entered	   into	   the	  Global	   South	   economic	   bloc	   arrangement	   between	  BRICS),	   and	  has	   served	   as	   a	   powerful	   exemplar	   of	   responsible	   handling	   of	   nuclear	   weapons	   and	   energy	  industries.	  	  South	  Africa	  is	  a	  leader	  in	  global	  nonproliferation	  as	  well	  as	  a	  state	  that	  has	  achieved	  significant	  mastery	  of	  nuclear	  technology,	   including	  most	  aspects	  of	  the	  nuclear	  fuel	  cycle	  and	  the	  successful	  de-­‐commissioning	   of	   a	   nuclear	   weapons	   program.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   abundance	   of	  (unemployed)	   nuclear	   experts	   in	   South	   Africa	   has	  made	   it	   a	   target	   country	   for	   those	   seeking	   to	  employ	  these	  engineers	  and	  scientists	  (for	  both	  licit	  and	  illicit	  purposes),	  and	  the	  increased	  demand	  for	   nuclear	   energy	   in	   South	  Africa	  maintains	   the	   country	   as	   a	   critically	   important	   partner	   in	   the	  global	  nuclear	  posture.	  	  After	  decades	  of	  tension	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  apartheid	  eras,	  relations	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  ruling	  ANC	  have	  not	  always	  been	  smooth.	  Most	  notably,	  the	  South	  Africans	  have	  been	  critical	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror.	  The	  two	  countries	  clashed	  over	  the	  creation	  and	  powers	  of	  the	   International	   Criminal	   Court	   and	   they	   have	   disagreed	   over	   methods	   to	   deal	   with	   crises	   in	  Zimbabwe,	  Côte	  d’Ivoire,	  and	  Libya.	  The	  tensions	  are	  not	  only	  diplomatic,	  but	  also	  affect	  strategic	  and	  military	  cooperation.	  Examples	  include	  military	  bases	  in	  Africa	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  AFRICOM.	  Given	  the	  critical,	  strategic	  importance	  of	  South	  Africa,	  the	  conveners	  of	  this	  workshop	  felt	  that	  it	   is	   important	   that	   the	   two	   countries	   seek	   to	   build	   understanding	   of	   each	   other’s	   strategic	  perspectives	  to	  promote	  a	  more	  stable,	  resilient,	  and	  transparent	  strategic	  relationship.	  The	  United	  States	   and	   South	   Africa	   have	   successfully	   worked	   together	   in	   the	   past	   to	   help	   achieve	  nonproliferation	  goals.2	  What	  we	  aimed	  to	  accomplish	  through	  this	  dialogue	  workshop	  was	  to	  help	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  example,	  within	  the	  Nuclear	  Suppliers	  Group,	  South	  Africa	  had	  initially	  objected	  to	  making	  the	  Additional	  Protocol	  a	  condition	  of	  supply	  of	  sensitive	  nuclear	  material	  because	  of	  its	  NAM	  membership	  and	  to	  prevent	  restrictions	  to	  its	  own	  commercial	  interests.	  However,	  the	  two	  countries	  cooperated	  to	  draft	  language	  on	  this	  issue	  that	  met	  South	  Africa’s	  concerns	  and	  satisfied	  one	  of	  the	  main	  goals	  of	  US	  nonproliferation	  policy.	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the	  two	  countries	  continue	  to	  build	  on	  their	  common	  interests	  and	  to	  recommend	  a	  way	  around	  the	  issues	  that	  divide	  them.	  	  
Increasing	  U.S.-­‐South	  African	  Goodwill,	  Understanding,	  and	  Cooperation	  The	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Africa	  share	  important	  interests.	  These	  include:	  
• Creating	   and	   enhancing	   the	   diplomatic	   and	   military	   capacity	   to	   respond	   to	   civil	  conflicts	  in	  Africa	  by	  strengthening	  the	  security	  architecture	  of	  the	  AU,	  particularly	  the	  African	  Standby	  Force;	  	  
• Facilitating	  the	  responsible	  generation	  and	  use	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  while	  avoiding	  the	  dangers	  of	  dual-­‐use	  technologies;	  
• Combating	  terrorism;	  and	  	  
• Ensuring	  freedom	  of	  navigation	  in	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  region.	  	  All	   of	   these	   issues	   share	   a	   common	   characteristic:	   they	   can	   influence	   the	   potential	   for	   the	  proliferation	   and	   use	   of	   nuclear	   weapons	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   African	   and	   indirectly	   impact	   the	  likelihood	  of	  civil	  conflicts	  in	  mineral-­‐rich	  regions	  (such	  as	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,	  Mali,	  and	   others)	   that	   might	   exploit	   uranium	   and	   other	   minerals.	   In	   January	   2013,	   the	   AU	   formally	  recognized	  the	   importance	  of	   these	   issues	  as	  an	  element	  of	   their	  peace	  and	  security	  agenda,	  with	  special	   reference	   to	   implementing	   UNSCR	   1540	   (2004)	   and	   finalizing	   negotiations	   with	   South	  Africa	   on	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   headquarters	   of	   the	   African	   Commission	   on	   Nuclear	   Energy	  (AFCONE)	  and	  related	  matters.	  	  	  This	  dialogue	  between	  intergovernmental,	  academic	  and	  civil	  society	  representatives	  from	  the	  U.S.-­‐South	  Africa	  aimed	  to	  deepen	  understanding	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  each	  nation	  views	  its	  most	  critical	  security	  concerns	  and	  the	  domestic	  debates	  that	  shape	  those	  views.	  In	  2012,	  the	  U.S.	  Consul	  General	   in	   Cape	   Town,	   Erica	   Barks-­‐Ruggles,	   emphasized	   the	   importance	   of	   U.S-­‐South	   African	  relations	  for	  the	  achievement	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  in	  Africa.	  She	  noted	  that	  the	  countries	  face	  similar	  challenges	  and	  seek	  common	  goals,	  yet	  often	  disagree	  on	  the	  tactics	  to	  achieve	  these	  goals.3	  	  
Why	  South	  Africa?	  	  Among	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  countries,	  South	  Africa	  has	  the	  largest	  economy	  in	  all	  of	  Africa,	  with	  a	  2011	  GDP	  of	  $524	  billion	  and	  a	  real	  growth	  rate	  of	  3.4%.4	   It	   is	   the	  most	   industrially	  developed	  country	  in	  Africa;	  maintains	  one	  of	  the	  most	  capable	  militaries	  and	  the	  only	  blue-­‐water	  navy;	  and	  is	  a	  leader	  in	  the	  Southern	  African	  Development	  Community	  (SADC)	  and	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  creators	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Erica	  Barks-­‐Ruggles,	  “South	  Africa	  and	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America:	  Common	  Challenges	  and	  Common	  Goals,”	  Presentation	  to	  the	  South	  African	  Institute	  of	  International	  Affairs,	  Centre	  for	  the	  Book,	  Cape	  Town,	  South	  Africa	  (January	  24,	  2012).	  Full	  text	  available	  at:	  http://southafrica.usembassy.gov/news_cpt_20120124_remarks2.html	  (accessed	  January	  30,	  2012).	  	  4	  Measured	  by	  purchasing	  power	  parity,	  reported	  by	  the	  CIA	  World	  Factbook:	  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­‐world-­‐factbook/geos/sf.html.	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of	   the	   AU.	   It	   also	   maintains	   an	   active	   nuclear	   energy	   sector,	   with	   the	   only	   commercial	   nuclear	  power	   plant	   on	   the	   entire	   continent,	   and	   plans	   to	   develop	   at	   least	   three	   more	   by	   2030	   (with	  ultimate	   plans	   to	   build	   between	   six	   and	   nine	   additional	   reactors,	   though	   this	   is	   under	   debate	   at	  present).	  While	  it	  is	  a	  strategically	  important	  country	  for	  the	  United	  States,	  public	  opinion	  polling	  reveals	  that	  among	  Africans,	   South	  Africans	   tend	   to	  be	   the	  most	   critical	  of	  both	   the	  United	  States	  and	   its	  policies.	   The	   negative	   evaluations	   delivered	   by	   South	   Africans	   are	   unusual,	   inasmuch	   as	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africans	  taken	  as	  a	  whole	  consistently	  record	  some	  of	  the	  most	  positive	  evaluations	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  its	  leaders,	  and	  its	  role	  in	  the	  world.	  A	  2008	  Gallup	  Poll	  revealed	  that	  in	  a	  worldwide	  sample,	   62%	   of	   the	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africans	   surveyed	   approved	   of	   the	   performance	   of	   U.S.	  government	   leadership,	  more	  than	  double	  the	  approval	  rating	  from	  any	  other	  world	  region.5	  This	  trend	  was	   continued	   in	   a	   series	   of	   Gallup	   polls	   in	   2009,	   as	   well	   as	   in	   a	   series	   of	   world	   opinion	  surveys	   conducted	   by	   the	   British	   Broadcasting	   Corporation	   (BBC).6	   In	   contrast	   to	   these	   positive	  assessments,	  often,	  fewer	  than	  40%	  of	  South	  Africans	  polled	  expressed	  positive	  evaluations	  of	  the	  United	   States.	   In	   the	   2008	   Gallup	   Poll,	   for	   example,	   only	   32%	   of	   South	   African	   respondents	  approved	  of	  U.S.	  performance,	  compared	  to	  92%	  in	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic.7	  A	  dialogue	  such	  as	   this	  one	   could	  help	   to	  engage	  with	  opinion	   leaders,	   such	  as	  academics,	   to	  help	   to	   improve	   the	  public	  perception	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  initiatives.	  There	   is	   also	   a	   direct	   nonproliferation	   dynamic	   that	   opinion	   leaders	   from	   the	   two	   countries	  could	   fruitfully	   address	   within	   the	   context	   of	   this	   dialogue.	   South	   Africa	   has	   been	   significantly	  affected	  by	  the	  sanctions	  against	  Iran	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  supported	  in	  early	   2012,	   as	   the	   country	  was	   forced	   to	   shift	   where	   it	   sources	   crude	   petroleum.8	  Within	   South	  Africa,	  the	  sanctions	  caused	  skyrocketing	  oil,	  because	  upwards	  of	  25%	  of	  the	  country’s	  oil	  had	  been	  sourced	  from	  Iran.	  The	  precise	  figure	  fluctuates	  monthly,	  but	  is	  down	  from	  the	  1970s,	  when	  South	  Africa	  obtained	  over	  75%	  of	  its	  oil	  from	  Iran.9	  Against	  a	  backdrop	  of	  steadily	  rising	  global	  oil	  prices,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Julie	  Ray,	  “U.S.	  Leadership	  Approval	  Highest	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,”	  Gallup	  World	  (April	  8,	  2008);	  http://www.gallup.com/poll/106306/US-­‐Leadership-­‐Approval-­‐Highest-­‐SubSaharan-­‐Africa.aspx	  (March	  15,	  2012).	  These	  results	  were	  based	  on	  telephone	  and	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interviews	  conducted	  throughout	  2005,	  2006,	  2007,	  and	  2008.	  	  6	  Access	  the	  World	  Opinion	  Service	  polls	  at	  http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/index.php?nid=&id=&lb=btvoc.	  See	  specifically	  the	  2011	  report,	  “Views	  of	  US	  Continue	  to	  Improve	  in	  2011	  BBC	  Country	  Rating	  Poll,”	  March	  7,	  2011;	  and	  http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/680.php?lb=btvoc&pnt=680&nid=&id=	  (March	  15,	  2012).	  	  7	  Ray,	  “U.S.	  Leadership	  Approval.”	  8	  See,	  for	  example,	  Devon	  Maylie,	  “South	  Africa,	  U.S.	  Discuss	  Iran	  Sanctions,”	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  (March	  23,	  2012),	  accessible	  at	  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577299670576241882.html;	  and	  Donwald	  Pressly,	  “Squeeze	  on	  Iran’s	  Oil	  Tricky	  for	  SA,”	  Business	  Report	  (March	  23,	  2012),	  accessible	  at	  http://www.iol.co.za/business/business-­‐news/squeeze-­‐on-­‐iran-­‐s-­‐oil-­‐tricky-­‐for-­‐sa-­‐1.1262125.	  9	  Maylie,	  op	  cit;	  Pressly,	  op	  cit.	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which	  were	  made	  drastically	  worse	   in	  South	  Africa	  (and	  other	  African	  countries)	  after	  the	  Libyan	  intervention,	  South	  Africans	  have	  blamed	  the	  U.S.	  interventionist	  and	  counter-­‐proliferation	  policies	  for	  causing	  their	  woes.	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  United	  States	  is	  at	  fault,	  this	  has	  fed	  on	  already	  relatively	  anti-­‐American	  rhetoric	  and	  sentiment	  in	  the	  South	  African	  press	  and	  public	  opinion.	  Again,	  one	  of	  the	  secondary	  goals	  of	  a	  dialogue	  such	  as	  this	  one	  would	  be	  to	   influence	  the	  opinion	   leaders	  who	  can	  help	  to	  assuage	  these	  reactions	  and	  perceptions	  of	  U.S.	  policies	  and	  actions.	  	  Many	   countries	   in	  Eastern	   and	   Southern	  Africa	  had	   already	  been	   experiencing	   fuel	   shortages	  when	  Libyan	  producers	  went	  offline	  in	  2011.	  The	  threat	  of	  sanctions	  for	  using	  Iranian	  oil,	  coupled	  with	  the	  fuel	  crises	  stimulated	  by	  the	  Libyan	  war,	  have	  strengthened	  the	  perceived	  need	  for	  energy	  independence	  and	  nuclear	  power	  in	  many	  African	  countries.	  This	  includes	  a	  growing	  desire	  to	  gain	  the	  ability	   to	  produce	  nuclear	   fuel	   for	  nuclear	  power	  stations.	  Multiple	  African	  governments	  have	  expressed	   their	   desire	   to	   promote	   policies	   that	   would	   increase	   the	   beneficiation	   of	   primary	  products	   in	   their	   countries	   instead	   of	   exporting	   minerals	   and	   re-­‐importing	   them	   after	   value-­‐additions.	  However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  uranium,	  acquiring	  the	  means	  to	  enrich	  uranium	  (the	  nuclear	  fuel	  cycle)	   holds	   proliferation	   risks	   and	   can	   result	   in	   suspicions	   if	   intentions	   are	   not	   understood	   and	  confidence	  building	  measures	  are	  not	  cultivated,	  including	  adhering	  to	  reasonable	  monitoring	  and	  verification	  measures.	  South	   Africa	   already	   has	   plans	   to	   increase	   its	   reliance	   on	   nuclear	   energy	   in	   the	   future.	   The	  country	   currently	   has	   the	   only	   nuclear	   energy	  plant	   on	   the	   entire	   continent,	   the	  Koeberg	   station	  near	  Cape	  Town,	  which	  houses	   two	  nuclear	   reactors.	   In	   operation	   since	  1984,	  Koeberg	  has	  been	  upgraded	   and	   currently	   uses	   uranium	   pressurized	  water	   reactors.	   It	   provides	   approximately	   six	  percent	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  energy.10	  Given	  the	  projected	  rise	  in	  demands	  for	  energy	  in	  the	  next	  20	  –	  50	  years,	  the	  South	  African	  government	  has	  signaled	  its	  intention	  to	  build	  more	  nuclear	  capacity.	  In	  May	  2011,	   the	  South	  African	  government	  promulgated	  an	  “Integrated	  Resource	  Plan	  (IRP)	  2010,”	  which	  committed	  the	  government	  to	  create	  between	  six	  and	  nine	  new	  nuclear	  power	  units,	  in	  three	  to	   four	   locations.	   Together,	   this	   will	   increase	   South	   Africa’s	   production	   of	   nuclear	   energy	   to	  9.6GW.11	  	  The	   plans	   to	   increase	   the	   production	   of	   nuclear	   power	   have	   not	   been	   without	   controversy,	  however,	   especially	   following	   the	   Fukushima	   crisis	   in	   Japan.	   In	   2010,	   public	   reactions	   led	   the	  government	   to	  pull	   the	  plug	  on	  a	   longstanding	  effort	   to	  build	   a	  pebble	  bed	  modular	   reactor.	  The	  South	  African	  nuclear	  industry	  had	  already	  invested	  $1.3	  billion	  in	  the	  project,	  over	  a	  period	  of	  16	  years.	   But	   experiences	   like	   the	   repercussions	   of	   the	   Iran	   sanctions	   give	   more	   impetus	   to	   the	  proponents	  of	  nuclear	  power,	  making	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  government	  will	  be	  able	  to	  successfully	  pursue	   its	   nuclear	   energy	   program	   despite	   the	   strident	   critics.	   To	   justify	   investment	   in	   nuclear	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Government	  of	  South	  Africa,	  “Nuclear	  Energy,”	  accessed	  at	  http://www.energy.gov.za/files/esources/nuclear/nuclear_back.html.	  	  11	  See	  “Nuclear	  power	  is	  a	  key	  part	  of	  SA's	  future,”	  Mail	  and	  Guardian	  (December	  9,	  2011),	  accessed	  at	  http://mg.co.za/article/2011-­‐12-­‐09-­‐nuclear-­‐power-­‐is-­‐a-­‐key-­‐part-­‐of-­‐sas-­‐future.	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power	  and	  the	  fuel	  cycle,	  South	  Africa	  will	  try	  to	  position	  itself	  as	  a	  global	  nuclear	  industry	  player.	  This	   implies	   the	   export	   of	   nuclear	   technology	   and	  material.	   It	   then	   becomes	   important	   that	   the	  South	  Africans	  do	  not	  see	  American	  nonproliferation	  efforts	  as	  a	  way	  to	  hamstring	  competition	  for	  U.S.	  nuclear	  industry	  players.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  proposed	  dialogue,	  the	  governmental	  commitment	  to	  nuclear	  energy	  creates	  an	  important	  point	  of	  contention	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  South	  Africa	  promotes	  the	  rights	  of	  all	  states	  to	   acquire	   and	   develop	   nuclear	   energy	   for	   peaceful	   purposes.	  With	   respect	   to	   a	   country	   such	   as	  Iran,	  many	  South	  Africans	  believe	  that	  U.S.	  imposition	  of	  sanctions	  is	  unjust,	  constitutes	  part	  of	  an	  international	  effort	   to	  prevent	   the	   increased	  power	  of	  an	   international	   rival,	   and	  essentially	   is	  an	  attempt	   to	   prevent	   other	   countries,	   particularly	   Muslim	   ones,	   from	   attaining	   the	   nuclear	   power	  they	  believe	  they	  need	  to	  develop.	  South	  Africa	  stands	  united	  with	  the	  other	  BRIC	  countries	  in	  this	  regard	   and,	   now	   that	   it	   has	   joined	   the	   economic	   bloc,	   this	   creates	   an	   even	  more	   powerful	   voice	  against	   the	   strategic	   priorities	   and	   international	   diplomatic	   efforts	   of	   the	   United	   States.	   When	  combined	  with	  the	  domestic	  pressures	  placed	  on	  the	  South	  African	  government	  by	  the	  energy	  crisis	  and	  its	  intention	  to	  become	  a	  bigger	  player	  in	  the	  global	  nuclear	  market,	  opposition	  to	  cooperation	  with	  U.S.	  security	  policies	  is	  a	  real	  possibility.	  These	  are	  the	  types	  of	  issues	  that	  can	  be	  productively	  discussed	  in	  an	  unofficial	  forum,	  and	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  perspectives	  of	  both	  sides	  to	  be	  shared	  and	  discussed	  in	  an	  informal	  setting.	  	  Given	   the	   dynamic	   nature	   of	   issues	   in	   this	   area	   affecting	  U.S.-­‐South	  African	   relations	   and	   the	  strategic	   position	   of	   South	   Africa	   for	   the	   achievement	   of	   U.S.	   goals	   on	   the	   continent,	   promoting	  cooperation	   between	   the	   two	   countries	   is	   extremely	   important.	   There	   have	   been	   concrete	   steps	  towards	   cooperation	   in	   multiple	   nonproliferation	   fora	   at	   the	   bilateral,	   multilateral	   and	   regional	  levels.	  This	  dialogue	  aimed	  to	  build	  on	  and	  support	  these	  official	  engagements	  with	  unofficial	  talks	  between	  academics	  from	  both	  countries.	  One	  such	  matter	  is	  PSI,	  to	  which	  South	  Africa	  has	  not	  signed.	  As	  a	  counter-­‐proliferation	  measure	  that	   involves	   intercepting	  WMD	   trafficking,	   the	   question	   is	  why	   South	   Africa	   is	   opting	   out	  when	  seventy	   other	   countries	   regard	   the	   PSI	   as	   important	   global	   measure	   in	   this	   area.	   South	   Africa’s	  geographical	  position	  (having	  the	  Indian	  and	  Atlantic	  Oceans	  as	  borders)	  makes	  the	  country	  a	  vital	  maritime	   component	   of	   the	   PSI.	   The	   dialogue	   could	   tease	   out	   the	   reasons	   for	   South	   Africa’s	  reluctance	   to	   join,	   e.g.	   resource	   limitations,	   concerns	   over	   taking	   on	   additional	   counter-­‐proliferation	   obligations,	   the	   implications	   for	   sovereignty	   and	   trade,	   concern	   over	   the	   PSI’s	  approach	   to	   counter-­‐proliferation,	   etc.	   The	   dialogue	   will	   also	   try	   to	   tease	   out	   how	   the	   US	   can	  encourage	  South	  Africa	  to	  review	  its	  stance	  on	  the	  PSI,	  e.g.	  offering	  military	  aid	  specifically	  targeted	  to	  counter-­‐proliferation	  within	  the	  PSI	  framework.	  Larger	   questions	   in	   U.S.-­‐South	   African	   relations	   remain	   unanswered.	   What	   does	   U.S.-­‐South	  African	  strategic	  partnership	  (and	  ‘going	  global’)	  actually	  mean?	  What	  are	  the	  rights	  and	  duties	  of	  each	   side?	   How	   can	   the	   two	   countries	   maximize	   the	   likelihood	   for	   cooperation	   on	   the	   issues	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discussed	   above?	   What	   are	   potential	   roadblocks	   to	   such	   cooperation?	   Given	   uncertainties	   from	  South	   Africa’s	   new	   BRICS	   membership	   and	   pursuit	   of	   energy	   independence,	   misunderstanding	  between	  the	  two	  sides	  is	  all	  too	  likely	  and	  opportunities	  for	  joint	  gains	  are	  easily	  squandered.	  Frank	  discussion	   between	   the	   South	   African	   and	   United	   States	   strategic	   communities	   is	   therefore	  essential.	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The	   first	   panel	   discussed	   the	   global	   and	   regional	   security	   trends	   as	   viewed	   by	   general	  international	  relations	  scholars	  from	  both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Africa.	  The	  overview	  of	  U.S.	  views	   emphasized	   that	   historically,	   U.S.	   interest	   in	   and	   prioritization	   of	   Africa	   has	   waxed	   and	  waned,	   especially	   when	   considering	   U.S.	   assessment	   of	   Africa’s	   strategic	   value.	   The	   Cold	   War	  provided	   a	   clear	   lens	   to	   prioritize	   foreign	   affairs,	   and	  within	   that,	   African	   policy	   received	   lower	  prioritization	   than	   other	   global	   areas.	   U.S.	   policy	   towards	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   between	   1989	   and	  2001	  was	  categorized	  by	  large	  shifts,	  again	  due	  to	  the	  low	  prioritization	  of	  African	  issues	  but	  more	  so	   the	   general	   lack	   of	   a	   concrete	   foreign	   policy	   agenda	   in	   that	   time	   period.	   At	   times,	  democratization,	   human	   rights,	   and	   economic	   development	   were	   prioritized,	   and	   for	   a	   brief	  moment,	  these	  considerations	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  trump	  strategic	  concerns.	  This	  began	  to	  change	  in	   1998	   after	   the	   bombings	   of	   the	   U.S.	   embassies	   in	   Kenya	   and	   Tanzania,	   but	   shifted	   most	  concretely	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  2001	  terrorist	  attacks.	  After	  9/11,	  geostrategic	  imperatives	  once	  again	  set	  foreign	  policy	  agendas	  and	  priorities.	  	  In	  the	  2000s,	  therefore,	  the	  United	  States	  policy	  community	  viewed	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  through	  the	   lens	   of	   ungoverned	   spaces	   and	   Africa’s	   place	   in	   the	   Global	  War	   on	   Terror,	  which	   prioritized	  Africa	   as	   geostrategically	   important	   and	   a	   potential,	   though	   indirect,	   security	   threat.	   The	   main	  security	   concerns	   today	   are	   drug	   trafficking,	   Islamic	   extremism,	  maritime	   security,	   peacekeeping	  support,	   and	   refugee	   issues.	   Despite	   this	   increase	   in	   U.S.	   attention,	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   is	   not	  prioritized	  as	  highly	   as	  North	  Africa	  or	  East	  Asia.	  The	  United	  States	   considers	   South	  Africa	   as	   an	  anchor	   state	   in	   Southern	   Africa	   and	   the	   continent,	   due	   to	   its	   preeminent	   political	   and	   economic	  position	  in	  the	  continent.	  	  Current	   U.S.	   foreign	   policy	   towards	   Africa	   is	   organized	   into	   “five	   pillars”:	   support	   for	  democratization;	   support	   for	  market-­‐based	   economic	   growth;	   conflict	   prevention	   and	   resolution;	  support	  for	  presidential	  initiatives;	  and	  working	  with	  Africans	  on	  transnational	  issues.	  In	  2007	  the	  Bush	  administration	  established	  AFRICOM	  as	  an	  agency	  to	  implement,	  not	  develop,	  policy.	  Overall,	  there	   is	   normal	   engagement	   in	   the	   theatre	   of	   security	   cooperation	  with	   few	   direct	   threats.	   U.S.-­‐South	  African	  relations	  are	  stronger	  when	  viewed	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  bilateral	  relations	  rather	  than	  within	  multilateral	  institutions.	  Potential	  areas	  for	  growth	  include	  market-­‐based	  concerns	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  closer	  economic	  ties.	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The	  overview	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  conception	  of	  global	  and	  regional	  security	  emphasized	  that	  the	  South	  African	  government	  has	  been	  committed	  to	  the	  same	  foreign	  policy	  themes	  since	  1994,	  while	  restructuring	  and	  repositioning	  South	  African	  foreign	  policy	  due	  to	  its	  emerging	  power	  aspirations.	  South	  African	  claims	  to	  continental	   leadership	  go	  back	  to	  the	  early	  20th	  century	  administration	  of	  Jan	   Smuts.	   According	   to	   South	   African	   Foreign	   Minister	   Nkoana-­‐Mashabane,	   “We	   have	   defined	  ourselves	   as	   a	   progressive	   agent	   for	   positive	   change.	   In	   practice,	   we	   have	   assumed	   the	   role	   of	  peacemaker	  and	  negotiator	  in	  Africa,	  and	  a	  champion	  of	  Africa’s	  interests	  abroad.”12	  South	  Africa’s	  foreign	  policy	  aims	  include	  an	  anti-­‐hegemony	  and	  independent	  foreign	  policy,	  which	  is	  aligned	  with	  the	  approach	  of	  other	  emerging	  powers	  like	  China	  and	  Brazil.	  	  In	   the	   last	   decade,	   South	   Africa	   has	   redefined	   its	   foreign	   policy	   aspirations	   of	   global	   and	  regional	  leadership.	  The	  course	  was	  set	  during	  the	  administration	  of	  Thabo	  Mbeki,	  who	  focused	  on	  foreign	  policy	  during	  his	  presidency	  (some	  say,	  more	  than	  domestic	  issues).	  Mbeki	  was	  a	  leader	  in	  creating	   the	  AU,	   hoping	   to	   help	   the	   continent	   assert	   itself	   in	   the	   global	   realm.	   To	   position	   South	  Africa	  more	   forcefully	   within	   Africa,	   he	   restructured	   South	   Africa’s	   foreign	   policy	   institutions	   to	  play	   a	   continental	   leadership	   role,	   and	   attempted	   to	   leverage	   South	  Africa’s	   international	   impact	  through	  strategic	  multilateralism	  –	   increased	  participation	  in	  BRICS,	   the	  G20,	  and	  as	  a	  UNSC	  non-­‐permanent	  member.	  This	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  shift	  South	  Africa	  from	  being	  a	  “European	  bastard	  in	  an	  African	  sea”	  to	  a	  true	  leader	  on	  the	  continent.	  Although	  now	  de-­‐racialized,	  South	  Africa	  has	  retained	  its	   leadership	   idea	  based	  on	  its	  position	  as	  the	  most	  developed	  African	  state.	  Additionally,	   to	  be	  a	  true	   regional	   leader,	   knowledge	   of	   the	   continent	   is	   a	   necessary	   prerequisite.	   South	   African	  awareness	  of	  the	  African	  continent	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  episodic	  and	  wanes	  the	  farther	  north	  it	  strays	  from	  the	  South	  African	  epicenter.	  	  Finally,	   the	   speaker	  argued	   that	   the	   current	  administration	  of	  President	   Jacob	  Zuma	  needs	   to	  shift	   the	   focus	   from	   foreign	  policy	   to	  domestic	   issues.	   South	  African	   foreign	  policy	   ambitions	   are	  slowly	   being	   realized,	   but	   unemployment	   and	   other	   economic	   issues	   hamper	   full	   domestic	   and	  regional	  success.	  The	  party	  politics	  of	  the	  ANC	  and	  the	  stain	  of	  corruption	  have	  damaging	  effects	  on	  leadership	  roles	  within	  the	  continent.	  The	  future	  will	  determine	  if	  South	  Africa	  can	  sustain	  its	  global	  and	   regional	   leadership	   positions	  while	   dedicating	   resources	   to	   domestic	   concerns	   and	   focusing	  political	  will	  on	  new	  networks.	  Although	  South	  Africa	  is	  recognized	  globally	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  Africa,	  there	  is	  a	  more	  contested	  view	  within	  Africa.	  Since	  RSA’s	  global	  status	  is	  based	  on	  the	  perception	  of	  its	   moral	   authority,	   economic	   dominance,	   and	   military	   capacity,	   declines	   in	   its	   economic	   and	  military	  position	  within	  Africa	  could	  challenge	  its	  claim	  to	  global	  and	  regional	  status.	  
Discussion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Maite	  Nkoana-­‐Mashabane,	  “SA’s	  aim:	  champion	  of	  Africa’s	  interests	  abroad,”	  Sunday	  Independent	  (January	  15,	  2012).	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The	   discussion	   focused	   on	   the	   South	   African	   views	   of	   U.S.	   actions	   and	   initiatives	   on	   the	  continent	   and	   the	   increasing	   securitization	   of	   U.S.	   defense	   policy	   in	   Africa.	   A	   South	   African	  participant	   cited	   a	   litany	   of	   puzzling	   recent	   U.S.	   foreign	   policy	   cases	   including	   Egypt,	   Libya,	  AFRICOM,	  and	  Syria.	  In	  response,	  several	  noted	  that	  for	  the	  United	  States,	  strategic	  concerns	  often	  override	   rhetorical	   commitments;	   and	   acknowledged	   that	   this	   can	   create	   trust	   issues	   for	   South	  Africa	  and	  the	  rest	  of	   the	  continent.	  An	  American	  participant	  commented	  that	   the	  U.S.	   frustration	  with	   the	   inherent	   difficulties	   of	   multilateral	   institutions	   is	   the	   cause	   for	   unilateralism,	   although	  acknowledged	   the	   negative	   international	   perceptions	   it	   creates.	   Furthermore,	   the	   perceived	  securitization	  of	  U.S.	   foreign	  policy	  persists	   globally	   despite	   lack	   of	   numerical	   evidence:	   both	   the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	   State	   and	  United	  States	  Agency	   for	   International	  Development	   (USAID)	  vastly	  outspend	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  (DoD)	  within	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  The	  visceral	  anti-­‐AFRICOM	  reaction	  promotes	  the	  negative	  perception	  of	  the	  United	  States	  on	  the	  continent.	  In	  regards	  to	   foreign	  assistance,	   the	  discussion	  also	   focused	  on	  the	  necessity	  that	  U.S.	  posture	  shift	   towards	   engaging	   emerging	   powers	   as	   equals,	   rather	   than	   clients.	   Expectations	   of	  modernization	  differ:	  RSA	  views	  modernization	   in	   the	   traditional	   sense	  of	  building	   infrastructure	  and	  developing	  the	  economy,	  while	  the	  United	  States	  views	  modernization	  in	  a	  contemporary	  light	  of	  equal	  rights	  and	  the	  mitigation	  of	  social	  ills.	  In	  the	  future,	  South	  Africa	  might	  look	  towards	  China	  to	   realize	   its	  development	  goals.	   In	  order	   to	  move	   the	  U.S.-­‐South	  Africa	   relationship	   towards	  one	  based	   on	   equality,	   the	   United	   States	   needs	   to	   support	   South	   Africa’s	   new	   forms	   of	   activism	   like	  norm	  construction	  and	  bridge-­‐building.	  These	  are	  necessary	   to	   support	   its	  position	  as	  an	  African	  leader	  and	  advocate	  “African	  solutions	  for	  African	  problems.”	  
Session	  Two:	  Nuclear	  Deterrence	  and	  Disarmament	  Considerations	  The	  second	  session	  focused	  on	   joint	  nuclear	  deterrence	  and	  disarmament	  considerations.	  The	  first	  speaker	  argued	  that	  RSA	  and	  the	  United	  States	  maintain	  fundamentally	  different	  perceptions	  on	  matters	  of	  national	  security.	  U.S.	   foreign	  policy	  and	  bilateral	  engagement	  with	  foreign	  states	   is	  best	   characterized	  by	   its	   expanding	  national	   security	   influence	   and	  a	   focus	  on	  bilateral	   relations,	  rather	   than	  working	  with	   and	   through	  multilateral	   institutions.	   In	   contrast,	   South	  Africa	   pursues	  regional	  and	  multilateral	  approaches	  and	  views	   the	  strengthening	  and	  deepening	  democracy	  as	  a	  means	  to	  address	  human	  security	  needs.	  In	  this,	  it	  views	  itself	  as	  a	  norm	  creator	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  continent.	   “Africa	   first”	   is	   the	   key	   driver	   in	   South	   Africa’s	   foreign	   policy	   of	   stabilization	   through	  global	   peacemaking,	   peace-­‐building,	   and	   UN	   mandated	   operations.	   South	   Africa	   views	   the	   AU	  framework	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   involvement	   in	   activities	   outside	   of	   its	   borders	   that	  will	   bring	   future	  economic	   benefits.	   This	   speaker	   also	   acknowledged	   that	   a	   more	   cynical	   interpretation	   of	   South	  Africa’s	  activism	  in	  the	  continent	  considers	  this	  a	  means	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  natural	  resources.	  	  In	   both	   the	   USA	   and	   RSA,	   foreign	   policy	   choices	   are	   not	   easily	   made	   or	   modified;	   instead,	  political	  choices	  often	  do	  not	  reconcile	  with	  humanistic	  impulses.	  In	  South	  Africa	  there	  is	  currently	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  to	  redefine	  and	  reformulate	  policy	  positions	  that	  integrate	  and	  formalize	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the	   country’s	   international	   role	   and	   strategic	   interests	   into	   a	   foreign	   policy	   framework.	   South	  Africa’s	  development	  profile	  determines	   its	   foreign	  policy	  and	   is	  a	  driver	  of	   its	  participation	  with	  BRIC	  states,	  although	  it	  has	  had	  difficulty	  harmonizing	  its	  own	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  with	  BRIC	  states	  and	  the	  AU.	  South	  Africa	  maintains	  a	  progressive	  international	  foreign	  policy	  agenda	  and	  remains	  anti-­‐imperialist.	   The	   intervention	   of	   Libya	   demonstrated	   the	   limits	   of	   African	   and	   South	   African	  peacemaking	  abilities,	  regime	  change	  as	  a	  driver	  of	  intervention,	  and	  the	  death	  of	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  (R2P)	  as	  a	  guiding	  concept	  for	  military	  intervention.	  	  South	  Africa	  views	  the	  UN	  as	  the	  best	  forum	  for	  developing	  countries	  to	  address	  arms	  control,	  nonproliferation,	   and	   renewable	   and	   reusable	   energy	   sources.	   Since	   it	   is	   also	   key	   to	   sustainable	  development,	  South	  Africa	  believes	  that	  nonproliferation	  is	  not	  a	  reason	  to	  obstruct	  or	  erode	  states’	  rights	   to	  nuclear	  energy.	  RSA	  articulates	   that	   all	   states,	   including	   Iran	  and	  North	  Korea,	  have	   the	  right	  to	  the	  peaceful	  use	  of	  nuclear	  energy.	  It	  is	  concerned,	  however,	  with	  non-­‐compliance	  of	  IAEA	  standards	  and	  nuclear	  weapons	  tests.	  South	  Africa	  seeks	  a	  WMD-­‐free	  world	  and	  has	  demonstrated	  its	   commitment	   on	  nuclear	  material,	   energy,	   and	  weapons	  nonproliferation	   and	   security	   through	  IAEA	  engagement.	  The	  American	  speaker	  began	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  Obama	  administration	  shares	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  previous	  administration	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  risks	  of	  nuclear	  proliferation	  and	  nuclear	  terrorism,	  but	  has	  offered	  a	  strategic	  response	  that	   is	  considerably	  different	   in	  many	  key	  areas.	  Current	  U.S.	  nuclear	  policy	  is	  based	  on	  President	  Obama’s	  2009	  Prague	  speech.13	  Obama	  has	  embraced	  the	  long-­‐term	  aspirational	   goal	  of	   a	  world	   free	  of	  nuclear	  weapons,	   re-­‐committed	   the	  United	  States	   to	   the	  NPT	  process,	  and	  taken	  a	  number	  of	  steps	  to	  reduce	  U.S.	  reliance	  on	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  nuclear	  deterrence.	  These	  actions	  are	  intended	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  serious	  U.S.	  commitment	  to	  disarmament	  in	   the	   hopes	   of	   generating	   greater	   international	   support	   for	   toughening	   current	   nonproliferation	  rules.	   Despite	   early	   gains	   such	   as	   the	  New	   Start	   treaty	   and	   a	   positive	   outcome	   at	   the	   2010	  NPT	  Review	  Conference,	  momentum	  behind	  the	  “Prague	  Agenda”	  has	  slowed	  considerably,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  foreign	  attitudes	  have	  changed.	  	  Steps	   to	   reduce	   reliance	  on	  nuclear	  weapons	   include	  new	  approaches	   to	  hedging	  geopolitical	  and	  technical	  risk	  in	  nuclear	  stockpile	  planning,	  changes	  to	  Cold	  War	  era	  planning	  assumptions	  and	  methodologies,	   and	   continued	   development	   of	   missile	   defense	   and	   other	   non-­‐nuclear	   weapons.	  Additionally,	   presidential	   guidance	   states	   that	   the	  United	  States	   can	   safely	  meet	   its	   requirements	  for	  deterrence	  with	  one-­‐third	  fewer	  weapons	  than	  permitted	  in	  the	  New	  Start	  Treaty,	  providing	  the	  basis	  to	  pursue	  further	  nuclear	  arms	  reductions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  In	  this	  first	  major	  foreign	  policy	  speech,	  President	  Barack	  Obama	  announced	  his	  doctrine	  for	  a	  nuclear-­‐free	  world	  by	  pledging	  to	  downgrade	  the	  importance	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  U.S.	  security	  doctrines,	  ratify	  the	  CTBT,	  and	  strengthening	  the	  NPT.	  For	  the	  text	  of	  this	  speech,	  see:	  	  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/05/obama-­‐prague-­‐speech-­‐on-­‐nu_n_183219.html.	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The	  individual	  steps	  to	  advance	  disarmament	  goals	  may	  appear	  modest,	  but	  the	  attitudinal	  shift	  of	   the	   Obama	   administration	   represents	   a	   significant	   evolution	   in	   U.S.	   nuclear	   posture.	   Rapid	  movement	  toward	  disarmament	  would	  carry	  significant	  dangers.	  The	  soundest	  approach	  is	  a	  step-­‐by-­‐step	   process	   that	   works	   to	   reduce	   U.S.	   reliance	   on	   nuclear	   weapons,	   reduce	   the	   weapons	  themselves,	   and	   strengthen	   the	   rules	   that	   prevent	   nuclear	   states	   from	   emerging.	   The	   panelist	  succinctly	  described	  the	  progress:	  “slow	  and	  steady;	  incremental	  but	  meaningful.”	  
Discussion	  The	  discussion	  in	  this	  session	  made	  clear	  that	  the	  different	  positions	  on	  disarmament	  sets	  the	   two	   states	   at	   odds	   on	   a	   fundamental	   level.	   One	   point	   of	   divergence	   centers	   on	   the	   pace	   and	  scope	   of	   disarmament.	   The	   United	   States	   is	   focused	   on	   a	   near-­‐term	   agenda	   to	   reduce	   existing	  nuclear	  weapons	  on	  a	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  basis,	  while	  South	  Africa	  wishes	  to	  see	  more	  far-­‐reaching	  steps	  to	   advance	   the	   more	   ambitious	   goal	   of	   achieving	   a	   nuclear	   weapons-­‐free	   world.	   Further,	   South	  Africa	   is	   skeptical	   about	   establishing	   conditions	   for	   achieving	   progress	   in	   disarmament	  (“conditionality”)	   that	   seem	   to	   favor	   a	   continued	   special	   status	   for	   the	  P5.	  The	  United	  States	   and	  other	  P5	   states	   continue	   to	   claim	  a	   special	   right	   to	   possess	  nuclear	  weapons	   and	   to	   use	   them	  as	  needed	  to	  respond	  to	  threats.	  As	  long	  as	  these	  states	  persist	  in	  relying	  on	  nuclear	  deterrence,	  South	  Africa	  will	  challenge	  their	  assertion	  of	  a	  legitimate	  right	  to	  possess	  nuclear	  weapons.	  One	  American	  participant	  suggested	  that	  if	  the	  United	  States	  ratified	  the	  CTBT,	  it	  could	  bridge	  some	  differences.	  The	   countries	   have	   different	   perspectives	   on	   how	   to	   measure	   and	   evaluate	   progress	   in	  disarmament.	  While	  U.S.	  participants	  noted	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  made	  substantial	  progress	  in	  achieving	   nuclear	   disarmament,	   several	   South	   African	   participants	   said	   flatly	   that	   “it	   was	   not	  enough.”	  The	   South	  Africans	   focus	  on	   the	  normative	   aspect	   of	   disarmament	   -­‐	   ratifying	   the	  CTBT,	  agreeing	   to	   FMCT,	   ratifying	   the	   Protocols	   to	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Pelindaba,	   and	   partnering	   in	   joint	   P5	  disarmament	  initiatives.	  The	   United	   States	   and	   South	   Africa	   also	   disagree	   on	   whether	   all	   nonproliferation	   rules	  should	  be	  applied	  universally	   to	  all	  states	  without	  exception.	  South	  Africa	  believes	   in	  universality	  and	   believes	   the	   United	   States	   promotes	   a	   double	   standard.	   This	   paternalistic	   attitude	   seeks	   to	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  nuclear	  states	  that	  behave	  responsibly	  and	  those	  that	  do	  not	  and	  then	  uses	  that	  distinction	  to	  justify	  exceptions	  to	  what	  should	  be	  nonproliferation	  rules	  that	  apply	  to	  all	  states.	   Another	  area	  of	  disagreement	   concerns	  access	   civil	  nuclear	   technology.	  The	  United	  States	  favors	   policies	   –	   nationally	   and	   in	   the	   NPT	   regime	   –	   that	   	   encourage	   states	   seeking	   civil	   power	  programs	   to	   purchase	   fuel	   cycle	   services	   through	   some	   type	   of	   market	   mechanism	   rather	   than	  through	   the	   acquisition	   of	   indigenous	   capabilities.	   South	   Africa	   views	   such	   an	   approach	   as	  inherently	   discriminatory	   and	   inconsistent	   with	   the	   right	   of	   NNWS	   under	   the	   NPT.	   This	   is	   a	  fundamental	  point	  of	  disagreement	  that	  surfaced	  in	  several	  workshop	  panels.	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Participants	   from	  both	  sides	  agreed	   that	   it	  would	  be	  difficult	   to	  bridge	   these	   fundamental	  differences	   in	  principle	  and	  perspective,	  which	  are	  deeply	  entrenched	  and	   reflect	   the	  entrenched	  views	  of	  the	  nuclear	  “haves”	  and	  “have	  nots.”	  The	  participants	  thought	  it	  best	  to	  avoid	  discussions	  that	  perpetuated	   these	  differences	   and	   instead	   focus	  on	   identifying	   a	  more	  pragmatic	   agenda	   for	  future	  discussions.	  	  
Session	  Three:	  Views	  on	  Nuclear	  Nonproliferation	  and	  Peaceful	  Uses	  This	  session	  sought	  to	  expand	  understanding	  of	  the	  American	  and	  South	  African	  perceptions	  of	  nuclear	  nonproliferation	  and	  peaceful	  uses.	  How	  does	  each	  country	  perceive	   the	  nonproliferation	  regime,	   expansion	   of	   nuclear	   energy,	   and	   the	   nuclear	   export	   regime	   and	   counter-­‐proliferation	  measures?	   The	   presenters	   and	   the	   discussion	   focused	   on	   the	   U.S.-­‐RSA	   incongruity	   on	   the	  prioritization	   of	   the	  NPT	   pillars	   and	   each	   country’s	   positions	   towards	   emerging	   nuclear	  weapon	  states	   (NWS).	   Perceptions	   on	   nonproliferation	   are	   historically	   divergent,	   but	   the	   presenters	  highlighted	   each	   country’s	   policy	   positions	   and	   ways	   to	   leverage	   the	   concerns	   to	   collectively	  strengthen	  the	  international	  nonproliferation	  regime.	  	  The	  first	  speaker	  began	  by	  noting	  that	  the	  U.S.	  focus	  on	  the	  nonproliferation	  pillar	  of	  the	  NPT	  is	  historically	   contentious	   for	   both	   the	   United	   States	   and	   South	   Africa.	   South	   Africa	   and	   the	   NAM	  countries	   argue	   that	   U.S.	   nuclear	   policy	   disproportionately	   focuses	   energy	   and	   resources	   on	  nonproliferation	   compared	   to	  disarmament.	   Furthermore,	   these	   countries	   argue	   that	  U.S.	  nuclear	  energy	  policy	  emphases	   security	  and	  nonproliferation	   rather	   than	   finding	  a	  way	   to	  meet	   the	   real	  energy	  requirements	  of	  emerging	  countries.	  Although	  the	  United	  States	  has	  decreased	   its	  nuclear	  arsenal	  by	  84%	  since	  1967,	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  had	  little	  interest	  in	  new	  multilateral	  accords	  (such	   as	   the	   Fissile	   Material	   Cutoff	   Treaty	   [FMCT])	   and	   no	   interest	   in	   ratifying	   existing	   treaties	  (such	  as	   the	  CTBT).	   Further,	   the	  Bush	  Administration	  postured	   that	   it	  was	  willing	   to	  use	  nuclear	  weapons	  against	  NNWS	  that	  had	  signed	  the	  NPT.	  This	  posture	  has	  left	  an	  enduring	  imprint	  on	  how	  the	   United	   States	   is	   regarded	   by	   South	   Africans	   on	   these	   issues.	   Despite	   the	   rhetorical	   shifts	  outlined	   in	   the	  previous	  panel	  and	   the	   signing	  of	   a	  New	  START	   treaty	  between	   the	  United	  States	  and	  Russia	   in	  which	  both	   countries	   agreed	   to	   reduce	   their	   stockpiles	  by	   thirty	  percent,	   in	   reality	  there	  has	  been	  a	  small	  change	   in	  bilateral	  relations	  with	  Russia,	   the	  CTBT	  is	  still	  not	  ratified,	  and	  there	  is	  an	  impasse	  on	  FMCT	  negotiations.	  	  In	  preparation	   for	   the	  2015	  NPT	  Review,	   the	  panelist	   argued	   that	   the	  United	   States	  needs	   to	  overcome	   significant	   domestic	   political	   hurdles.	   The	   limited	   implementation	   of	   the	   2010	  RevCon	  Action	  Plan	  lowered	  expectations	  of	  reforms	  post-­‐2015.	  As	  long	  as	  Iran	  and	  North	  Korea	  continue	  their	  trajectory,	  the	  United	  States	  will	  continue	  to	  focus	  its	  political	  energy	  on	  nonproliferation,	  not	  disarmament	   and	   energy	   issues.	   While	   rhetorical	   political	   will	   exists,	   a	   follow-­‐up	   to	   START	   is	  unlikely	  and	  the	  imbalance	  within	  the	  three	  pillars	  of	  the	  NPT	  is	  likely	  to	  remain.	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In	  order	  to	  advance	  the	  nonproliferation	  regime,	  the	  panelist	  endorsed	  utilizing	  the	  NPT	  Review	  Process	   as	   leverage	   to	   promote	   global	   solutions	   through	   capacity	   building	   in	   the	   Global	   South.	  Addressing	  the	  resource	  needs	  of	  poorer	  states	  will	   foster	  conditions	  for	  sustainable	  commitment	  to	   the	  NPT.	   South	  Africa	   demonstrated	   previous	   leadership	   on	   this	   issue,	   and	   both	   states	   should	  partner	  together	  to	  lay	  the	  international	  foundations	  for	  a	  “global	  21st	  century	  NPT	  regime.”	  Speaking	   on	   the	   South	   African	   perspective,	   the	   panelist	   emphasized	   that	   each	   country	   has	   a	  unique	   perspective,	   framework,	   priorities,	   and	   influences,	   but	   the	   ultimate	   shared	   goals	   are	  strengthening	   the	   nuclear	   nonproliferation	   regime	   through	   disarmament	   and	   enhancing	   regional	  and	   global	   peace.	   For	   South	   Africa,	   the	   African	   countries,	   and	   the	   NAM,	   nonproliferation	   and	  disarmament	  policy	  are	   inexorably	   linked	  with	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights.	  Furthermore,	  while	  South	   Africans	   saw	   evidence	   of	   narrow	   success	   in	   U.S.	   nuclear	   policy,	   anything	   short	   of	  disarmament	  is	  overshadowed	  as	  disappointment.	  This	  is	  also	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  South	  African	  view	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  ignored	  or	  dismissed	  South	  African	  priorities	  and	  perspectives,	  and	  not	  kept	   its	  nuclear	  nonproliferation	  and	  arms	  control	  commitments	  made	  at	   important	   international	  for	  a	  such	  as	  previous	  NPT	  RevCons	  (in	  1995,	  2000,	  and	  2005).	  The	   South	   African	   perspective	   is	   that	   the	   NPT	   is	   the	   cornerstone	   of	   the	   global	   nuclear	  disarmament	  and	  the	  nonproliferation	  regime,	  and	  that	  equal	  weight	  must	  be	  placed	  on	  all	  three	  of	  the	  NPT	  pillars.	  These	  pillars	  are	  inextricably	  linked	  and	  mutually	  reinforcing,	  so	  focusing	  on	  one,	  as	  does	   the	  United	  States,	   threatens	   to	  unbalance	   the	  entire	  enterprise.	   In	   the	  2010	  NPT	  RevCon,	  RSA	   had	   serious	   concerns	   over	   the	   collective	   lack	   of	   urgency	   and	   seriousness	   towards	  disarmament.	  Furthermore,	  South	  Africa	   feels	   that	   it	  has	  not	  been	  recognized	   in	  the	   international	  arena	  for	  its	  significant	  progress	  in	  implementing	  past	  agreements	  and	  restoring	  trust	  in	  the	  post-­‐apartheid	  era.	  The	  panelist	  argued	  that	  South	  Africa	  is	  the	  only	  member	  of	  NAM,	  other	  than	  Belarus,	  that	   is	   party	   to	   all	   the	   nonproliferation	   treaties,	   and	   that	   this	   should	   earn	   it	   respect	   within	   the	  global	   community.	   Disarmament	   is	   also	   necessary	   because	   there	   are	   unacceptable	   humanitarian	  consequences	  for	  use	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Contrary	  to	  deterrence	  theory,	  South	  Africa	  believes	  that	  nuclear	  weapons	  detract	  from	  security	  rather	  than	  guaranteeing	  it.	  	  In	   regards	   to	   nonproliferation,	   RSA	   wants	   to	   expand	   the	   peaceful	   application	   of	   nuclear	  technology	   within	   and	   understands	   the	   necessity	   of	   strengthening	   safeguards	   to	   establish	  confidence	   and	   trust.	   Furthermore,	   establishing	   credible	   assurances	   of	   undeclared	   nuclear	  materials	  and	  activities	  can	  be	  advanced	  through	  the	  AP	  as	  an	   indispensable	   instrument	   for	   IAEA	  inspections.	   South	   Africa	   advocates	   for	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Pelindaba	   to	   further	   enhance	   disarmament	  and	  the	  nuclear	  nonproliferation	  regime.	  South	  Africa	   supports	   the	   inalienable	   right	   of	   all	   states	   to	   a	  peaceful	  nuclear	   energy	  program	  under	   Article	   IV	   of	   the	   NPT.	   These	   principles	   were	   established	   in	   President	   Eisenhower’s	   1953	  Atoms	  for	  Peace	  proposal,	  but	  received	  less	  attention.	  Since	  South	  Africa	  is	  party	  to	  the	  NPT,	  it	  has	  an	   internationally	   legally	   binding	   obligation	   to	   exercise	   its	   right	   to	   enrich	   uranium	   for	   peaceful	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purposes.	  This	  is	  further	  emphasized	  in	  Article	  II	  of	  the	  IAEA	  statute:	  to	  “accelerate	  and	  enlarge	  the	  contribution	   of	   atomic	   energy	   to	   peace,	   health	   and	   prosperity	   throughout	   the	   world.”14	  Nevertheless,	   the	  United	   States	   and	   other	   leading	   international	   actors	   seem	   to	   oppose	   this	   right.	  The	  P5	  emphasize	  the	  inherent	  dangers	  in	  NNWS	  pursuing	  indigenous	  fissile	  material	  production.	  While	   Article	   IV	   entitles	   these	   rights,	   the	   P5	   states	   prioritize	   the	   nonproliferation	   obligations	   in	  Articles	  II	  and	  III	  as	  a	  demonstration	  of	  full	  compliance.	  While	  South	  Africa	  calls	  on	  NAM	  countries	  to	  exercise	   their	  Article	   IV	   right,	   it	   simultaneously	   calls	  on	  North	  Korea	   to	  dismantle	  any	  nuclear	  weapons	   and	   re-­‐enter	   the	   NPT	   and	   for	   Iran	   to	   become	   more	   transparent	   in	   its	   NPT	   related	  reporting	  and	  in	  welcoming	  IAEA	  inspections.	  	  The	   panelist	   argued	   that	   the	   RSA	   nuclear	   agenda	   is	   historically	   consistent	   and	   very	   clear	   of	  future	   intentions.	   South	  Africa	   does	   not	   anticipate	   progress	   during	   the	   2015	  NPT	  RevCon	   unless	  advancement	  is	  made	  on	  equalizing	  the	  other	  pillars.	  To	  the	  South	  Africans,	  the	  prospect	  of	  success	  hinges	   on	   advancing	   the	   disarmament	   cause	   and	   establishing	   a	  Middle	   East	   NWFZ.	   South	   Africa	  believes	  its	  intentions	  are	  clearly	  shown	  through	  the	  dismantling	  of	  the	  nuclear	  weapons	  program	  and	   joining	   international	   binding	  obligations:	   it	   has	  been	   to	   the	  dark	   side	   and	  now	   it	   is	   ready	   to	  reap	   the	   benefits.	   Although	   RSA	   is	   a	   NAM	   state,	   the	   United	   States	   should	   not	   focus	   on	   the	   NAM	  collective	   rhetoric	   and	   instead	   look	   at	   South	   Africa’s	   overarching	   historical	   record.	   Furthermore,	  PSI	  is	  ideologically	  consistent	  with	  RSA	  policy,	  but	  needs	  to	  be	  approached	  and	  presented	  correctly.	  Overall,	  the	  U.S.-­‐RSA	  relationship	  on	  nuclear	  issues	  is	  strained,	  but	  South	  Africa	  views	  dialogue	  and	  partnership	  based	  on	  mutual	  respect	  of	  priorities	  as	  the	  best	  avenue	  for	  substantive	  progress.	  
Discussion	  The	   discussion	   following	   the	   presentations	   focused	   on	   how	   South	  Africa	   and	   other	   countries	  believe	   that	   possessing	   nuclear	   weapons	   provides	   states	   with	   power	   and	   leverage	   in	   the	  international	   community,	   which	   influences	   the	   aspirations	   and	   implications	   of	   emerging	   nuclear	  states.	  The	  perceived	  and	  unintended	  link	  between	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  power	  resonates	  strongly	  among	   the	   South	  African	   public	   and	   policymakers.	  Many	   South	  Africans	   question	   the	   decision	   to	  dismantle	  their	  nuclear	  program,	  arguing	  that	  retaining	  it	  would	  have	  granted	  them	  more	  status	  in	  the	  international	  community.	  For	  example,	  they	  argue,	  the	  P5	  states	  are	  all	  NWS	  as	  well.	  Many	  feel	  that	   had	   South	   Africa	   retained	   its	   weapons,	   it	   could	   make	   more	   demands	   in	   international	   fora.	  Additionally,	   the	  South	  African	  position	   is	   that	   “possession	   is	   the	  driver	  of	  proliferation”	  and	  that	  the	  U.S.	  deterrence	  strategy	  promotes	  this	  cycle.	  	  While	   the	  NAM	  states	   are	  an	   important	   coalition	   for	   challenging	   the	  P5	   status	  quo,	  questions	  were	  raised	  on	  NAM	  influence	  moving	  forward.	  Many	  agreed	  that	  the	  P5	  and	  NAM	  states	  want	  the	  same	   ends,	   such	   as	   a	   non-­‐nuclear	   weaponized	   Iran,	   but	   the	   P5	   and	   other	   states	   tend	   not	   to	  understand	   this.	   One	   participant	   noted	   that	   President	   Zuma	   wrote	   a	   letter	   to	   the	   new	   Iranian	  president	   recommending	   that	   he	   reevaluate	   the	   country’s	   nuclear	   program.	   The	   NAM	   disagrees	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Agency,	  “The	  Statute	  of	  the	  IAEA,”	  http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html.	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with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  P5	  over	  strategy	  and	  tactics,	  as	  previously	  discussed	  in	  this	  and	  the	  previous	  sessions.	  While	  the	  United	  States	  trusts	  that	  South	  Africa	  is	  a	  “good	  nonproliferation	  partner”	  (a	  phrase	  South	   Africans	   disdains),	  many	   nonproliferation	   risks	  were	   raised	   in	   discussion.	   One	   participant	  questioned	  the	  security	  of	  the	  Pelindaba	  nuclear	  research	  center	  after	  an	  attempted	  robbery.	  South	  African	   participants	   confirmed	   that	   it	   was	   a	   petty	   theft	   and	   only	   computers,	   no	   nuclear	  weapon	  materials,	   were	   stolen.	   From	   the	   discussion	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   the	   South	   Africans	   are	   sensitive	   to	  accusations	   that	   they	   cannot	   responsibly	   secure	   the	  nuclear	  materials	   that	   currently	   exist	  within	  the	   country;	   arguing	   that	   the	   break-­‐in	   at	   the	   Pelindaba	   facility	   in	   2007	   was	   about	   stealing	  computers	  and	  not	  gaining	  access	  to	  nuclear	  material.	  In	  South	  African	  parlance,	  Pelindaba	  was	  an	  “affirmative	  shopping	  experience”	  (redistribution	  of	  goods	  from	  those	  with	  to	  those	  without).	  They	  were	   strongly	   insistent	   that	   serious	   incidents	   of	   nuclear	   technology	   theft	   could	   not	   occur	   in	   the	  future.	   Yet	   the	   United	   States	   still	   treats	   the	   South	   Africans	   as	   not	   fully	   responsible	   and	   able	   to	  safeguard	   nuclear	   material,	   leading	   to	   an	   undertone	   that	   South	   Africa	   itself	   is	   a	   proliferation	  concern.	   In	   this	   context,	   strengthening	   the	   relationship	   is	   practically	   difficult.	   Other	   proliferation	  and	   security	   concerns	   included	   the	   A.Q.	   Khan	   network	   in	   South	   Africa,	   the	   possession	   and	  maintenance	  of	  nuclear	  medicine	  equipment,	  and	  the	  near	  inability	  of	  the	  Vastrap	  storage	  facility	  to	  obtain	  an	  NEC/NER	  license.	  
Session	  Four:	  U.S.	  and	  South	  African	  Domestic	  Political	  Interests	  Relating	  to	  
Nonproliferation,	  Arms	  Control,	  and	  Disarmament	  Issues	  In	   the	   session	   on	   domestic	   political	   interests	   relating	   to	   nonproliferation,	   arms	   control,	   and	  disarmament	   interests,	  speakers	  reviewed	  the	  domestic	   landscape	   in	   the	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Africa.	  Common	  themes	  included	  publics	  relatively	  disengaged	  from	  nuclear,	  nonproliferation,	  and	  disarmament	   policy;	   active	   lobby	   groups	   heavily	   influenced	   by	   the	   nuclear	   industry	   in	   each	  country;	   and	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   small	   yet	   engaged	   set	   of	   civil	   society	   groups	   that	   oppose	   both	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  energy.	  One	  key	  difference	  related	  to	  how	  the	  politics	  of	  national	  legislatures	  affect	  nuclear	  policy	  in	  each	  country.	  The	  dominance	  of	  the	  ANC	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  parliament	  creates	  a	   relatively	  unified	  approach	   to	  nuclear,	   nonproliferation,	   and	  disarmament	   issues	   in	  parliament,	  which	  eases	  the	  passage	  of	  key	  legislation	  and	  treaty	  ratification.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  divisions	  between	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  within	  the	  Republican	  Party,	  mean	  that	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	   has	   a	   tendency	   to	   deadlock	   on	   the	   ratification	   of	   international	   treaties	   and	   other	  nonproliferation	  initiatives.	  The	  Americans	  in	  the	  group	  felt	  that	  South	  Africans	  did	  not	  understand	  how	   significantly	   divisions	   between	   and	   within	   the	   two	   political	   parties	   affect	   legislation	   and	  international	  policies.	  	  The	  commentary	  on	  domestic	  political	   interests	   in	  South	  Africa	  revolved	  around	  several	  main	  themes.	  First,	  there	  was	  agreement	  that	  the	  South	  African	  general	  public	  is	  not	  well	  informed	  about	  nuclear	   matters	   and	   attention	   comes	   from	   several	   international	   and	   national	   anti-­‐nuclear	   civil	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society	  movements	   that	  operate	   in	  South	  Africa.	  A	   small	   group	  of	  academics	  are	  also	  engaged	  on	  these	   issues.	   The	   most	   influential	   community	   within	   South	   African	   civil	   society	   is	   the	   nuclear	  energy	   industry.	   Both	   civil	   society	   and	   academics	   tend	   to	   be	   opposed	   to	   the	   plans	   of	   the	  government	   to	   expand	   its	   nuclear	   energy	   and	   related	   industries,	   but	   these	   constituencies	   wield	  little	   influence	   on	   decision-­‐making.	   Marginalized	   and	   stigmatized,	   civil	   society	   remains	   sceptical	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  and	  participation	  in	  the	  democratic	  process	  in	  respect	  of	  nuclear	  matters.	  Given	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  ANC,	  nuclear	  and	  disarmament	  policy	  is	  formulated	  primarily	  at	  the	  executive	  level	  and	  within	  the	  relevant	  government	  ministries;	  Parliament	  is	  predominantly	  silent	  on	  the	  issue.	  This	  party	  and	  executive	  dominance	  leads	  to	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  government	  has	  a	  relatively	   coherent	   stance	   towards	   nuclear	   energy,	   nonproliferation,	   and	   disarmament.	  Importantly,	  nuclear	  energy	   issues	  are	  viewed	  as	  a	  means	   to	  achieve	   the	  national	   transformation	  project,	  while	  a	  firm	  stance	  on	  nuclear	  nonproliferation	  is	  viewed	  as	  an	  important	  component	  of	  an	  international	   activist	   agenda.	   The	   South	   African	   government’s	   stated	   intention	   is	   to	   develop	   the	  country’s	   nuclear	   energy	   sector	   and	   related	   industries,	  which	   it	   feels	  will	   serve	   as	   a	   stimulus	   to	  socio-­‐economic	  development	  via	  industrial	  development.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  it	  is	  open	  about	  these	  goals,	   the	  government	  remains	  secretive	  about	   its	   full	  range	  of	  nuclear	   intentions	  and,	   finally,	  has	  stigmatized	   anti-­‐nuclear	   groups	   in	   the	   country.	   For	   example,	   during	   the	   Mbeki-­‐era,	   anti-­‐nuclear	  groups	   were	   effectively	   stigmatized	   as	   representing	   the	   marginalized	   interests	   of	   white	   middle-­‐class	  liberals,	  and	  thus	  of	  being	  anti-­‐state	  and	  racist.	  By	  playing	  the	  race	  card,	  the	  government	  was	  able	   to	   direct	   attention	   away	   from	   the	   criticism,	   and	   to	   avoid	   answering	   the	   charges	   of	   the	   anti-­‐nuclear	  lobby.	  The	   main	   actors	   and	   groups	   that	   are	   involved	   in	   domestic	   policies	   in	   South	   Africa	   were	  identified	  as:	  
• Community	   groups	   opposed	   to	   the	   locations	   identified	   for	   the	   six	   nuclear	   power	   stations	  planned	  to	  be	  constructed	  by	  2030;	  
• Anti-­‐nuclear	  groups	  such	  as	  Earthlife	  Africa,	   the	  Coalition	  against	  Nuclear	  Energy	  (CANE),	  and	   the	   Environmental	   Monitoring	   Group	   (EMG),	   which	   protest	   against	   allowing	   nuclear	  ships	  to	  dock	  at	  the	  Cape	  Town	  harbor;	  
• International	  NGOs	  concerned	  about	  the	  government’s	  ability	  to	  manage	  nuclear	  energy	  in	  a	  responsible	  and	  secure	  manner,	  such	  Greenpeace	  International;	  and	  	  
• The	   local	   nuclear	   energy	   industry	   private	   actors,	  which	   focus	   predominantly	   on	   research	  and	  development	  capabilities.	  Regarding	   U.S.	   domestic	   politics	   around	   nonproliferation,	   three	   themes	   emerged	   in	   the	  workshop.	  First,	  similar	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  South	  Africa,	  the	  general	  public	  tends	  to	  lack	  knowledge	  and	  do	  not	  prioritize	  nuclear	  weapons	  issues.	  Therefore,	  most	  of	  the	  activism	  and	  public	  influence	  on	  the	  policy	  process	  comes	  from	  special	  interest	  groups.	  The	  private	  nuclear	  industry,	   led	  by	  the	  Nuclear	   Energy	   Institute,	   is	   especially	   important	   and	   powerful.	   Because	   the	   general	   populace	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continues	   to	   have	   concerns	   about	   international	   nuclear	   energy,	   rather	   than	   lobbying	   for	   the	  expansion	   of	   nuclear	   energy	   within	   the	   United	   States,	   the	   nuclear	   industry	   seeks	   to	   find	   new	  overseas	   markets	   for	   civilian	   nuclear	   products	   to	   sustain	   its	   U.S.	   defence	   contracts.	   A	   second	  significant	  lobby	  group	  includes	  the	  environmental	  groups	  opposed	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  nuclear	  industry	   and	   non-­‐profit	   organizations	   opposed	   to	   nuclear	   proliferation.	   Groups	   like	   the	   Arms	  Control	   Association,	   the	   Center	   for	   a	   Liveable	   World,	   the	   Council	   for	   Arms	   Control	   and	  Nonproliferation,	   and	   the	   Ploughshares	   Fund	   are	   the	   strongest	   advocates	   of	   nonproliferation.	   A	  third	   influential	   lobby	   includes	   diaspora	   groups	  who	  monitor	   nuclear	   policy	   towards	   their	   home	  countries	   (examples	   of	   vocal	   diasporas	   include	   Israel	   and	   India).	   In	   another	   similarity	   to	   South	  Africa,	   nuclear	   and	   arms	   control	   issues	   have	   taken	   backseat	   to	   other	   foreign	   policy	   issues	   in	  Congress	  and	  policy	  tends	  to	  emanate	  from	  the	  executive	  branch.	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   U.S.	   nuclear	   policy	   is	   becoming	  more	   strategic	   and	   less	   based	   on	   blanket	  principles	  of	  nonproliferation,	  and	  is	  increasingly	  guided	  by	  foreign	  policy	  interests	  in	  geopolitically	  important	   regions	   and	   relations	  with	   specific	   countries.	   Different	   from	   South	   Africa,	   however,	   is	  how	   divisions	   with	   Congress	   affect	   the	   policy	   process.	   Divisions	   between	   the	   two	   parties	   in	  Congress	  and	  within	   the	  Republican	  Party	  affect	  both	   the	  content	  of	  policy	  and	   the	  ratification	  of	  international	   treaties.	   More	   important	   than	   the	   bipartisan	   divide	   is	   the	   division	   within	   the	  Republican	   Party	   itself.	   This	   internal	   factionalization	   within	   the	   Republican	   Party	   provides	   an	  opportunity	   to	   exploit	   the	   differences	   and	   pass	   legislation	   on	   key	   issues,	   but	   this	   has	   not	   yet	  occurred.	   The	   incoherent	   U.S.	   nuclear	   policy	   is	   a	   result	   of	   the	   congressional	   gridlock,	   divisions	  within	   the	   Republican	   Party,	   lack	   of	   education	   and	   attention	   from	   the	   general	   public,	   and	   low	  attention	  from	  the	  administration.	  Nuclear	  policy	  and	  arms	  control	  debates	  have	  taken	  a	  back	  seat	  to	   other	   foreign	   policy	   issues	   (Iraq,	   Afghanistan,	   terrorism,	   etc.).	   The	   panel	   discussed	   how	   these	  themes	  have	  played	  out	   in	  recent	  policy	   initiatives,	   including	   the	  strategic	  partnership	  with	   India	  starting	  in	  2005,	  Obama’s	  declared	  commitment	  to	  Global	  Zero,	  and	  U.S.	  policy	  toward	  Iran.	  	  
Discussion	  	   The	   following	   discussion	   highlighted	   how	   the	   origins	   each	   country’s	   nuclear	   policy	   have	  implications	  for	  future	  plans	  and	  the	  nuclear	   legacy.	  First,	  South	  Africa	  views	  some	  of	  the	  nuclear	  safety	  and	  security	  requirements	  as	  obstacles	  to	  economic	  activity	  due	  to	  added	  costs.	  South	  Africa	  wants	  to	  enrich	  uranium	  and	  tries	  to	  justify	  this	  desire	  with	  the	  benefits	  of	  added	  jobs	  and	  prestige.	  Instead	  of	  enriching	  HEU	  for	  medical	  isotopes	  (as	  Canada,	  the	  biggest	  supplier	  to	  the	  United	  States	  does),	  South	  Africa	  is	  forced	  to	  enrich	  LEU	  to	  lower	  the	  proliferation	  risk.	  South	  African	  participants	  viewed	   the	   limitations	   on	   the	   role	   South	   Africa	   can	   play	   in	   the	   nuclear	   energy	   field	   as	   purely	   a	  manifestation	   of	   economic	   diplomacy	   rather	   than	   real	   security	   concerns.	   There	   was	  acknowledgement	   that	   factors	   such	   as	   supply	   security,	   environmental	   concerns,	   and	   lack	   of	  capacity	  are	  real	  factors,	  but	  they	  aggravate	  the	  accusations	  of	  double	  standards.	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   Another	  point	  of	  discussion	  included	  South	  Africa’s	  legacy	  of	  nuclear	  scientists	  and	  whether	  they	  should	  be	  a	  source	  of	  concern.	  A	  South	  African	  participant	  highlighted	  how	  nuclear	  scientists	  previously	  had	  a	  strong	  “international”	  culture	  despite	  the	  limitations	  of	  sanctions.	  Furthermore,	  it	  was	  also	  made	  clear	  that	  no	  nuclear	  scientists	  have	  gone	  over	  to	  the	  “other	  side”	  since	  they	  were	  initially	  picked	  because	   they	  were	  patriots	   and	   there	   is	   now	  pride	   to	  work	   in	   the	  nuclear	   sector.	  South	  Africans	  view	  American	  concerns	  with	  the	  integrity	  of	  their	  nuclear	  scientists	  as	  “confusing	  the	   issue”	   and	   “throwing	   suspicion.”	   There	   is	   concern	   from	  both	   sides	   regarding	   the	  mentorship	  problem	  and	  generational	  gap	  as	  the	  former	  apartheid	  scientists	  retiring	  without	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  nuclear	  scientists	  taking	  their	  place.	  	  	   Last,	   there	   was	   a	   brief	   but	   important	   discussion	   regarding	   the	   potential	   humanitarian	  consequences	  of	  nuclear	  proliferation.	  Some	  participants	  saw	  this	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  engage	  on	  a	  non-­‐nuclear	  topic	  and	  train	  first	  responsible	  on	  the	  consequences	  of	  a	  nuclear	  use.	  	  
Session	  Five:	  Identifying	  Areas	  of	  Mutual	  Interest	  
In	  this	  session	  we	  asked	  the	  speakers	  and	  participants	  to	  consider	  what	  issues	  the	  United	  States	  and	   South	   Africa	   generally	   agree	   are	   short	   and	   long-­‐term	   opportunities	   and	   challenges	   in	  nonproliferation,	   arms	   control,	   and	   disarmament.	   What	   competing	   priorities	   affect	   the	   range	   of	  issues	   in	  which	  the	  countries	  agree?	  How	  can	  the	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Africa	   further	  promote	  and	   enhance	   the	   implementation	   of	   UNSCR	   1540	   in	   line	   with	   the	   January	   2013	   AU	   Assembly	  Decision	   (Assembly/AU/Dec.472)?	   The	   session	   presentations	   and	   discussion	   highlighted	   the	  following	  points.	  	  Particular	  areas	  of	  agreement	  and	  opportunities:	  
WMD	  nonproliferation:	  From	  the	  U.S.	  perspective,	  the	  speaker	  highlighted	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Africa	  have	  been	  mutually	  dedicated	  to	  preventing	  the	  spread	  of	  WMD,	  a	  common	  theme	  in	   the	   workshop.	   South	   Africa	   has	   demonstrated	   its	   nonproliferation	   commitment	   in	   numerous	  ways	   over	   the	   past	   two	   decades	   by	   providing	   leadership	   and	   support	   to	   the	   associated	   WMD	  nonproliferation	  treaties,	  conventions,	  and	  control	  regimes,	  including	  IAEA	  safeguards	  and	  the	  NPT	  (including	   the	   AP),	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Pelindaba	   (establishing	   a	   NWFZ	   in	   Africa),	   Nuclear	   Security	  Summit	  participation,	   signing	  and	   ratifying	  numerous	  other	   conventions,	   including	   the	  CTBT,	   the	  CWC,	  and	  the	  BWC.	  The	  United	  States	  recognizes	  that	  RSA	  is	  the	  most	  important	  and	  able	  actor	  in	  Africa	   in	   this	   area.	   The	   variety	   and	   extent	   of	   bilateral	   collaboration	   in	   this	   area	   impressed	  participants,	   and	   include,	   for	   example,	   the	   International	   Nuclear	   Safeguards	   and	   Engagement	  Program	   (INSEP),	   the	   Partnership	   for	   Nuclear	   Security	   (PNS)	   and	   scholarships	   and	   student	  exchanges.	   The	   two	   states	   also	   cooperate	   in	   multilateral	   forums,	   such	   as	   on	   promoting	   nuclear	  nonproliferation	  in	  the	  AU	  and	  at	  the	  G8.	  Collaboration	  on	  issues,	  such	  as	  implementation	  of	  UNSCR	  1540	  and	  managing	  uranium	  resources	  also	  exist	  at	  the	  bilateral	  level.	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Bilateral	  cooperation	  on	  WMD	  and	  terrorism:	  The	  speaker	  reviewed	  a	  large	  number	  of	  bilateral	  efforts	   to	   combat	   global	   terrorism	   and	   the	   spread	   of	   WMD:	   investigations	   and	   prosecutions	   of	  specific	  cases	  related	  to	  South	  Africans;	  the	  conversion	  of	  SAFARI-­‐1	  to	  LEU	  fuel	  operations	  (and	  U.S.	  repatriation	  of	  6.3	  kg	  of	  HEU);	  security	  awareness	  and	  physical	  security	   improvements	  at	  nuclear	  facilities;	  health	  and	  safety	  initiatives;	  and	  UNSCR	  1540	  implementation	  and	  cooperation	  with	  other	  AU	  state	  reporting.15	  Bilateral	  cooperation	  in	  this	  area	  is	  steered	  by	  an	  agreement	  signed	  in	  2009,	  which	  established	  the	  U.S.-­‐South	  Africa	  Nonproliferation	  and	  Disarmament	  Dialogues.	  South	  Africa	  welcomed	   Obama’s	   Prague	   speech	   and	   other	   measures	   related	   to	   reducing	   the	   role	   of	   nuclear	  weapons	  in	  U.S.	  national	  security	  strategy	  and	  the	  effects	  that	  have	  had	  on	  U.S.	  nuclear	  posture.	  However,	  differing	  views	  exist	  around	  additional	  states	  acquiring	  fissile	  material,	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  Nuclear	  Renaissance	  (more	  players,	  more	  pathways),	  the	  right	  to	  uranium	  enrichment,	  oversight	  and	  control	  of	  dual	  use	  items,	  and	  cooperative	  efforts	  on	  UNSCR	  1540.	  From	  the	  South	  African	  perspective,	  the	  speaker	  felt	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  highlight	  the	  areas	  of	  agreement	  without	   referring	   to	  areas	  of	  disagreement.	   In	  many	  cases	   there	  may	  be	  agreement	   in	  principle	   but	   there	   is	   disagreement	   on	   how	   to	   achieve	   certain	   goals.	   This	   echoed	   a	   theme	   that	  further	  underlining	  its	  importance:	  finding	  synergy	  between	  approaches	  and	  understanding	  can	  be	  difficult.	  Once	  again,	  the	  speaker	  raised	  the	  issue	  that	  both	  countries	  want	  to	  strengthen	  the	  NPT,	  but	   the	   difference	   between	   how	   they	   weight	   the	   three	   pillars	   can	   lead	   to	   problems.	   Here,	   the	  speaker	  raised	  the	  by	  now	  recurring	  issue	  of	  how	  the	  pressure	  placed	  on	  NNWS	  is	  often	  viewed	  as	  double	  standards	  given	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  NWS	  are	  not	  leading	  by	  example.	  This	   speaker	   raised	   the	   perceptions	   issue,	   articulating	   that	   non-­‐participation	   by	   the	   Global	  South	   (including	   RSA)	   in	   nonproliferation	   initiatives	   is	   often	   viewed	   by	   the	   USA	   as	  “noncompliance.”	   However,	   U.S.	   officials	   need	   to	   understand,	   the	   speaker	   argued,	   that	   such	  “noncompliance”	   is	   often	   simply	   a	   lack	   of	   capacity	   to	   implement	   these	   initiatives.	   Given	   this,	   the	  simple	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “noncompliance”	  by	  U.S.	  officials	  was	  considered	  insulting	  and	  showed	  a	  lack	  of	   understanding	   of	   the	   South	   African	   position:	   too	   many	   competing	   priorities	   and	   not	   enough	  knowledgeable	  personnel	  to	  manage	  them.	  In	  their	  view,	  noncompliance	  indicates	  that	  the	  United	  States	  considers	  this	  an	  issue	  of	  political	  will,	  not	  a	  capacity	  constraint.	  	  The	  South	  African	  government	  places	  emphasis	  on	  its	  regional	  context,	  with	  particular	  focus	  on	  the	  AU.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  United	  States	  can	  help	  to	  develop	  regional	  and	  sub-­‐regional	  strength	  and	  interest	   in	   nuclear	   issues,	   including	   promoting	   sharing	   of	   information	   through	   the	   AU.	   U.S.	  resources	  would	   be	   best	   spent	   focused	   on	  UNSCR	  1540	  which	   the	  AU	   is	   taking	   up	   as	   a	   portfolio	  matter.	   The	   South	   African	   government	   has	   requested	   assistance	   from	   the	   United	   States,	   which	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  two	  states	  to	  collaborate.	  Also	  in	  regional	  context,	  the	  United	  States	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  strategic	  partner	  in	  implementing	  the	  Pelindaba	  Treaty	  and	  ratification	  of	  the	  protocols	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Upon	  request,	  a	  list	  of	  these	  initiatives	  can	  be	  obtained	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  Bureau	  of	  International	  Security	  and	  Nonproliferation.	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(with	   appended	   reservations/interpretative	   declarations	   with	   respect	   to	   Diego	   Garcia).	   U.S.-­‐RSA	  cooperation	  can	  also	  be	  directed	  to	  create	  open	  environments	  for	  dialogue,	  especially	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	   The	   question	   was	   also	   posed	   where	   the	   United	   States	   is	   positioned	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  humanitarian	  consequences	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  used,	  an	  issue	  that	  RSA	  feels	  strongly	  about.	  The	  break-­‐out	  sessions	  were	  tasked	  with	  identifying	  areas	  of	  mutual	  interests,	  agreement,	  and	  opportunity	  for	  cooperation	  or	  greater	  cooperation.	  Within	   mutual	   interest	   and	   agreement,	   there	   was	   consensus	   that	   both	   South	   Africa	   and	   the	  United	  States	  desire	  good	  outcomes	  to	  the	  2015	  RevCon.	  They	  both	  believe	  that	  a	  straightforward	  and	  non-­‐contentious	  approach	  is	  the	  most	  important	  aspect	  for	  conference	  dynamics.	  Furthermore,	  there	   is	   mutual	   interest	   between	   both	   the	   United	   States	   and	   South	   Africa	   to	   approach	   capacity	  building	  practically.	  Another	  area	  of	  agreement	  was	  that	  academia	  would	  be	  a	  suitable	  and	  willing	  interlocutor	   to	  build	   capacity	  outside	   the	  official	   channels.	  By	   increasing	   technical	   cooperation	  at	  the	  scientist-­‐to-­‐scientist	  level,	  there	  are	  greater	  chances	  for	  cooperation	  by	  removing	  the	  discussion	  from	  the	  political	  realm.	  	  Furthermore,	  there	  was	  a	  vibrant	  discussion	  regarding	  the	  opportunities	  for	  initial	  cooperation	  and	   expanding	   cooperation	   into	   other	   areas.	   First,	   many	   participants	   viewed	   the	   public	   as	   an	  important	  partner	  for	  capacity	  building.	  It	  was	  viewed	  as	  essential	  to	  have	  positive	  public	  opinion,	  and	  acknowledged	   the	  challenges	   in	   the	   future	  course,	  prioritization	  of	   issues,	   and	  demographics	  since	   lack	   of	   public	   interest	   is	   indicative	   of	   lack	   of	   threat	   perception.	   One	   participant	   raised	   the	  historical	  success	  of	  the	  landmines	  campaign	  as	  a	  precedent	  for	  a	  campaign	  to	  raise	  awareness	  of	  nuclear	   weapons.	   Another	   way	   to	   harness	   public	   interest	   and	   support	   is	   by	   demonstrating	   that	  projects	   will	   work;	   one	   possible	   project	   is	   the	   peaceful	   application	   of	   AFCONE.	   Other	   areas	   of	  opportunity	  include	  detaching	  controversial	  issues	  away	  from	  core	  areas	  of	  agreement	  to	  increase	  progress	   through	  a	   step-­‐by-­‐step	  approach.	  By	   first	   tackling	   the	  soft	   security	   issues	  outside	  of	   the	  political	  realm,	  there	  would	  be	  increased	  opportunities	  for	  reaching	  the	  hard	  security	  issues	  in	  the	  future.	  For	  example,	   South	  Africa	  does	  not	  have	   ideological	  obstacles	   to	  PSI	   and	  dealing	  with	   the	  economic	  implications	  is	  an	  avenue	  for	  eventually	  reaching	  PSI	  ratification.	  Last,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  look	   past	   the	   big	   WMD	   issues	   and	   reach	   the	   same	   goal	   through	   focusing	   on	   other	   areas	   of	  agreement,	  like	  on	  small	  arms.	  	  
Session	  Six:	  Looking	  to	  Areas	  of	  Misunderstanding	  and	  Disagreement	  In	  this	  session,	  the	  speakers	  and	  general	  discussion	  focused	  on	  the	  issues	  that	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  United	  States	  view	  differently.	  The	  speakers	  were	  asked	  to	  consider	  topics	  ranging	   from	  Iran,	  sanctions,	  the	  IAEA	  Additional	  Protocol,	  minimizing	  stocks	  and	  the	  civil	  use	  of	  HEU	  in	  lieu	  of	  LEU,	  or	  competing	  economic	  interests	  in	  nuclear	  technology,	  trade	  and	  the	  uranium	  market.	  	  Presenting	  the	  U.S.	  view,	  the	  speaker	  argued	  that	  general	  foreign	  policy	  misunderstandings	  and	  disagreements	   feed	   into	   nuclear	   relations.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   South	   Africa	   lacks	   trust	   due	   to	   U.S.	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historic	  use	  of	  hard	  power	  (military;	  coercion)	  in	  foreign	  policy	  with	  examples	  including	  the	  2003	  invasion	   of	   Iraq,	   the	   creation	   of	   AFRICOM,	   U.S.	   policy	   toward	   Zimbabwe,	   and	   U.S.	   support	   for	  NATO’s	  military	  intervention	  in	  Libya.	  These	  incidents	  suggest	  that	  the	  United	  States	  ignores	  South	  Africa’s	   foreign	   policy	   principles:	   a	   commitment	   to	   diplomacy	   rather	   than	   force	   and	   African	  solutions	  to	  African	  problems.	  A	  speaker	  from	  among	  the	  South	  Africans	  argued	  that	  the	  two	  states	  have	  different	  identities	  that	  influence	  how	  interests	  are	  defined	  and	  pursued	  and	  shape	  how	  each	  country	  operates	  in	  the	  international	  realm.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  discussion	  amongst	  the	  participants	  about	  the	  divergence	  between	  principles	  and	  tactics:	  while	  the	  countries	  may	  agree	  on	  end-­‐states,	  goals	  and	  general	  principles,	  they	  often	  disagree	  on	  the	  means.	  	  Both	   sides	   emphasized	   that	   RSA	   sees	   the	   United	   States	   as	   not	   living	   up	   to	   its	   commitments	  under	  the	  NPT	  and	  agreements	  reached	  at	  the	  review	  conferences,	  e.g.	  the	  13	  Practical	  Steps	  of	  the	  2000	  NPT	  RevCon.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  United	  States	  does	  not	  fully	  trust	  the	  motivations	  behind	  South	  Africa’s	  desire	   to	   regain	  production	  capabilities	  across	   the	  entire	   fuel	   cycle.	  The	  discussion	  again	  focused	  on	  how	  the	  United	  States	  sometimes	  refers	  to	  South	  Africa	  as	  a	  “proliferation	  danger”	  or	  “concern.”	  Again,	  panelists	  noted	  that	  the	  label	  is	  not	  clear	  and	  may	  imply	  a	  deliberate	  inclination	  of	   the	  South	  African	  government	   to	   restart	  a	  nuclear	  weapons	  option,	  which	  places	   the	  country’s	  civilian	  nuclear	  energy	  program	  under	  suspicion.	  	  Particular	   aspects	   of	   the	   nonproliferation	   and	   disarmament	   regime	   that	   the	   two	   disagree	   on	  are:	  
The	   “three	  pillars”	  of	   the	  NPT:	  RSA	   sees	   all	   pillars	  of	   the	  NPT	  as	   equal	  but	  believes	   the	  United	  States	   emphasizes	  pillar	  2:	   “nonproliferation.”	   In	   contrast,	   pillar	  1:	   “rights	  of	   all	   states	   to	  nuclear	  technology	  for	  peaceful	  purposes”	  is	  strictly	  conditional	  on	  observance	  of	  nonproliferation	  rules.	  To	  the	  United	  States,	  pillar	  3	  (disarmament)	   is	  optional	  and	  aspirational	  and	  can	  be	  pursued	  outside	  the	  context	  of	  the	  NPT,	  e.g.,	  through	  the	  New	  START	  and	  other	  bilateral	  arrangements	  with	  Russia.	  South	   Africa	   sees	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   NWS	   to	   disarm	   as	   a	   violation	   of	   the	   NPT	   that	   is	   roughly	  equivalent	  to	  certain	  NNWS	  not	  complying	  with	  NPT	  rules.	  
Iran:	  Long	  term	  relations	  between	  the	  ANC	  and	  Iran	  mean	  that	  South	  Africa	  has	  more	  trust	  than	  the	  United	  States	  in	  Iranian	  statements	  that	  Iran	  is	  peacefully	  developing	  nuclear	  energy.	  RSA	  has	  voted	  for	  resolutions	  against	  Iran’s	  intransigence	  even	  though	  it	  has	  been	  rhetorically	  emphasizing	  Iran’s	  inalienable	  right	  to	  nuclear	  energy	  and	  the	  fuel	  cycle	  for	  peaceful	  uses.	  Sanctions	  against	  Iran	  are	  a	  bigger	   “ask”	   for	   RSA	   as	   a	   result	   of	   historic	   relationship	   and	   reliance	   on	   Iranian	   oil	   (previously,	  providing	  a	  quarter	  of	  RSA’s	  oil	   imports).	  American	  sanctions	  against	  companies	  dealing	  with	  the	  Iranian	  government	  have	  had	  economic	  and	  reputational	  impact	  on	  South	  African	  companies.	  The	  urgency	  for	  RSA	  to	  resolve	  the	  Iran	  issue	  was	  seen	  in	  President	  Zuma’s	  mentioning	  of	  the	  issue	  in	  his	  congratulatory	  letter	  to	  Iranian	  President	  Rouhani	  after	  his	  recent	  election	  to	  office.	  
Nuclear	   weapons,	   NPT	   Article	   VI,	   and	   Global	   Zero:	   South	   Africa	   sees	   the	   very	   existence	   of	  nuclear	  weapons	  as	  problematic	  whether	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  P5	  or	  any	  other	  states.	  RSA	  espouses	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equality	   among	   states	   and	   believes	   that	   nuclear	   weapons	   are	   one	   of	   the	   greatest	   sources	   of	  inequality;	   the	  so-­‐called	  nuclear	  apartheid.	  The	  United	  States	  views	  New	  START	  as	   the	  good	   faith	  first	  steps	  on	  the	   long	  road	  to	  Global	  Zero;	   in	  contrast,	  RSA	  sees	  a	  gradual,	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  approach	  outside	  the	  NPT	  framework	  as	  lip	  service	  to	  Article	  VI.	  South	  Africa	  wants	  to	  see	  unconditional	  and	  substantive	  reductions	  in	  nuclear	  weapons	  as	  a	  definitive	  indication	  of	  total	  disarmament.	  	  
RSA’s	   NAM	   membership	   and	   identity:	   South	   Africa	   works	   with	   the	   NAM,	   which	   opposes	   the	  dominance	   of	   “superpowers”	   and	   emphasizes	   equality,	   justice,	   and	   fairness	   in	   international	  relations	  against	   a	  history	  of	   colonialism,	  often	   referred	   to	  as	   “a	  principled	  position.”	   In	   contrast,	  the	   United	   States	   believes	   that	   superpower	   leadership	   has	  maintained	   the	   stability	   of	   the	   global	  order	  and	  the	  relatively	  peaceful	  world	  since	  1945.	  South	  Africa,	  like	  the	  NAM,	  does	  not	  appreciate	  third	  parties	  negotiating	  measures	  “above	  their	  heads”	  and	  then	  presenting	  these	  measures	   to	  be	  implemented,	  as	  a	  fait	  accompli.	  South	  Africa	  sees	  itself	  as	  representative	  of	  NAM	  in	  nuclear	  forums	  like	  the	  Nuclear	  Suppliers	  Group	  (NSG)	  and	  feels	  accountable	  to	  NAM,	  which	  makes	  it	  difficult	   for	  RSA	  to	  take	  positions	  that	  contradict	  NAM	  positions.	  The	  Arab	  League	  is	  a	  strong	  group	  within	  NAM	  that	  puts	  Israel’s	  nuclear	  status	  on	  the	  agenda.	  The	  United	  States	  is	  content	  with	  Israel’s	  ambiguous	  nuclear	  policy,	  which	  provides	   an	   important	   part	   of	   its	   security.	   South	  Africa	  wants	   to	   see	   Israel	  disarm,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  position	  of	  Egypt	  and	  other	  NAM	  states.	  	  
Nuclear	  Weapon	  Free	  Zones	  (NWFZs):	  South	  Africa	  sees	  NWFZs	  as	  a	  fundamental	  part	  of	  the	  NPT	  goal	   of	   nuclear	  disarmament.	   In	   contrast,	   the	  U.S.	   defense	   establishment	   views	  NWFZs,	   including	  protocols	   of	   the	   African	   Nuclear	   Weapons	   Free	   Zone	   (AFNWFZ),	   as	   intended	   to	   close	   military	  options	   to	  NWS	   through	  negative	   security	  guarantees.	  The	  U.S.	   Senate	   is	   customarily	   reluctant	   to	  ratify	  treaties,	  including	  NWFZ	  treaties.	  	  
The	  Indo-­‐U.S.	  nuclear	  deal	  and	  Indian	  membership	  of	  the	  NSG:	  Despite	  RSA’s	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	   (IBSA)	  and	  BRICS	  membership,	   it	  was	  reluctant	   to	  allow	   the	  Bush	  Administration	   to	  push	  through	  agreements	  to	  allow	  nuclear	  exports	  to	  India.	  South	  Africa	  believes	  that	  because	  India	  violated	   the	   NPT	   by	   redirecting	   peaceful	   nuclear	   technology	   to	  military	   purposes	   and	   remained	  outside	  the	  nonproliferation	  regime,	  it	  should	  have	  been	  penalized.	  But	  allowing	  exports	  of	  nuclear	  material	   to	   India	  normalized	   it	   as	   a	   nuclear	  weapons	   country,	   and	   in	   South	  Africa’s	   view,	  was	   in	  violation	   of	   the	   NPT.	   South	   Africa	   sees	   a	   double	   standard:	   India	   was	   provided	   an	   exception	   to	  export	   nuclear	  material	   to	   a	   state	  without	   a	   comprehensive	   safeguard	   agreement;	   however,	   RSA	  and	  other	  NSG	  members	  are	  required	  to	  abide	  by	  many	  nonproliferation	  obligations	  without	  India’s	  inclusion.	  Now	  the	  United	  States	  wants	  India	  to	  become	  a	  member	  of	  the	  NSG,	  which	  would	  prevent	  similar	   obligations	   from	   being	   imposed	   in	   the	   future.	   RSA	   is	   likely	   to	   eventually	   support	   Indian	  membership	   but	   will	   have	   to	   be	   able	   to	   justify	   this	   position	   to	   the	   NAM.	   This	   may	   require	  concessions	   from	   India,	   such	   as	   joining	   the	  CTBT.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   time	   is	   ripe	   to	  pursue	   issues	  that	  have	  been	  on	  the	  back	  burner	  in	  previous	  administrations,	  such	  as	  this	  one.	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Article	  IV	  and	  RSA’s	  pursuit	  to	  be	  a	  global	  nuclear	  industry	  player:	  RSA,	  along	  with	  the	  NAM,	  opposes	   any	   measures	   that	   impede	   what	   they	   perceived	   to	   be	   an	   inalienable	   right	   to	   nuclear	  technology	  for	  peaceful	  purposes.	  As	  an	  emerging	  power	  RSA	  sees	  itself	  playing	  its	  rightful	  role	  as	  a	  country	  with	  an	  advanced	  nuclear	   industry	   in	   the	   international	  market.	  RSA’s	  stated	  policy	   is	   the	  pursuit	  of	  building	  the	  capacity	  to	  beneficiate	  its	  minerals,	  including	  uranium.	  It	  will	  thus	  not	  give	  up	   or	   limit	   its	   option	   to	   enrich	   uranium	   and	   therefore	   did	   not	   support	   the	   idea	   of	   signing	   up	   to	  international	  fuel	  banks,	  a	  proposal	  that	  the	  United	  States	  supports	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  limit	  and	  control	  the	  spread	  of	  sensitive	  nuclear	  technology	  and	  material.	  	  
Article	   IV	   and	   the	   AP:	   Under	   the	   Bush	   Administration,	   the	   United	   States	   pursued	   a	   policy	   that	  would	  deny	  any	  state	  without	  an	  already	  functioning	  nuclear	  fuel	  cycle	  access	  to	  such	  technology,	  irrespective	   of	   intent.	   The	   U.S.	   push	   to	   make	   the	   AP	   a	   condition	   of	   supply	   of	   sensitive	   nuclear	  technology	  and	  material	  (ENR)	  was	  seen	  in	  the	  context	  of	  former	  President	  Bush’s	  nuclear	  policy.	  The	  AP	  strengthens	  IAEA	  safeguards	  of	  civil	  nuclear	  programs	  to	  monitor	  and	  verify	  non-­‐diversion	  to	   military	   uses,	   but	   is	   additional	   to	   the	   comprehensive	   safeguard	   system	   to	   which	   the	   NPT	  members	   are	   legally	   bound.	   Although	   South	   Africa	   has	   an	   AP	   in	   place	   it	   did	   not	   support	   this	  measure,	  not	   least	  because	  an	  exemption	  was	  negotiated	   for	  Brazil	   and	  Argentina.16	  RSA	  and	   the	  United	  States	  cooperated	  to	  negotiate	  text	  in	  the	  NSG	  that	  RSA	  was	  able	  to	  sell	  to	  NAM.	  However,	  it	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  Abdul	  Minty	  (the	  South	  African	  ambassador	  to	  the	  IAEA	  and	  NSG)	  noted	  that	  the	   NSG	   is	   outside	   the	   nonproliferation	   regime	   and	   should	   not	   be	   used	   as	   a	   pseudo-­‐IAEA.	   The	  matter	  is	  now	  under	  discussion	  at	  the	  IAEA.	  	  	  
Fissile	  Material	   Treaty	   and	   the	   Fissile	  Material	   Cutoff	   Treaty	   (FMT/FMCT):	   In	   general,	  RSA	  resists	  measures	  that	  do	  not	  revise	  P5	  privileges	  or	  what	  they	  consider	  to	  be	  the	  historic	  injustices	  built	  into	  NPT.	  This	  is	  manifested	  in	  the	  tension	  over	  fissile	  material	  for	  nuclear	  weapons:	  eliminate	  all	   fissile	  material	   or	   focus	  on	  eliminating	  new	  production	  of	   fissile	  material.	   For	  RSA,	   any	   treaty	  that	  does	  not	  address	  reductions	  in	  the	  existing	  stockpiles	  of	  fissile	  materials	  within	  the	  NWS	  in	  a	  legally-­‐binding	   way	   is	   a	   non-­‐starter	   (i.e.,	   the	   FMT).	   Failing	   to	   address	   this	   would	   perpetuate	  historical	   imbalances	  between	  NNWS	  and	   the	  NWS/P5.	   In	  contrast,	   the	  United	  States	  emphasizes	  the	  need	  to	  stop	  new	  production	  of	  fissile	  material,	  leaving	  existing	  stockpiles	  out	  of	  the	  treaty.	  This	  would	   promote	   the	   role	   of	   bilateral	   and	   voluntary	   arrangements	   to	   reduce	   existing	   stockpiles	   of	  fissile	  material,	  pointing	  to	  the	  bilateral	  efforts	  of	  Russia	  and	  the	  US	  to	  reduce	  their	  fissile	  material	  (Fissile	  Material	   Cutoff	   Treaty).	   The	   difference	   is	   not	   simply	   one	   of	   semantics	   (as	   the	   tension	   is	  often	  portrayed),	  but	  of	  basic	  principles.	  	  
CTBT	   ratification:	   RSA	  wants	   to	   see	   the	  United	   States	   ratify	   the	  CTBT.	   It	  was	  negotiated	  by	   the	  State	   Department	   in	   1996,	   rejected	   by	   the	   U.S.	   Senate	   in	   1999,	   and	   the	   chances	   that	   it	   will	   be	  ratified	  are	  slim,	  especially	  in	  the	  current	  U.S.	  Congress.	  Despite	  overtures	  to	  multilateral	  fora	  under	  the	   Obama	   administration,	   the	   U.S.	   remains	   resistant	   to	   have	   international	   organizations	   make	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Neither	  have	  APs	  in	  place,	  but	  they	  have	  a	  bilateral	  regime,	  the	  Brazilian–Argentine	  Agency	  for	  Accounting	  and	  Control	  of	  Nuclear	  Materials	  (ABACC),	  considered	  by	  most	  to	  be	  weaker	  than	  the	  AP.	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rules	  about	  what	  it	  sees	  as	  its	  strategic	  assets	  and	  security	  interests.	  Domestic	  politics	  and	  interests	  will	  continue	  to	  curtail	  progress	  on	  this	  issue.	  	  
NPT	  Withdrawal	   clause:	   Article	   X	   of	   the	  NPT	   confirms	   the	   right	   of	  member	   states	   to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  Treaty	  if	  “extraordinary	  events”	  related	  to	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  Treaty	  jeopardizes	  the	  supreme	   interests	   of	   the	   country.	   The	  United	   States	  wants	   to	  make	   it	  more	  difficult	   for	   states	   to	  withdraw	  so	  states	  (like	  Iran	  or	  North	  Korea)	  may	  use	  the	  Treaty	  to	  get	  nuclear	  technology	  that	  will	  eventually	  serve	  their	  respective	  aims	  to	  build	  nuclear	  weapons,	  violating	  the	  Treaty.	  	  
To	  deal	  with	  these	  tensions	  and	  misunderstandings,	  participants	  suggested:	  	  
• Increased	  diplomatic	  communications	  at	   the	  track	  one	  and	  two	  levels	  because	  the	  current	  system	  of	  strategic	  dialogue	  and	  lower	  level	  dialogues	  are	  thought	  to	  work	  well.	  
• Increased	  U.S.	  investment	  for	  capacity	  building	  in	  South	  Africa.	  
• Foreign	  Service	  Officials	  could	  better	  communicate	  U.S.	  positions	  to	  RSA	  counterparts;	  and	  U.S.	  officials	  could	  better	  understand	  South	  African	  concerns,	  priorities,	  and	  constraints.	  
• U.S.	  elite	  education/workshops	  to	  impress	  on	  RSA	  elites	  why	  CTBT	  or	  Pelindaba	  Protocols	  ratification	  are	  difficult	   in	   the	  United	  Sates	  and	  vice	  versa	   to	  explain	  why	  RSA	  may	   take	  a	  position	  that	  seems	  contradictory	  to	  its	  stated	  principles.	  
• A	  “no	  first	  use”	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  posture	  from	  the	  United	  States	  to	  gain	  confidence	  from	  South	  Africa	  that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  moving	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	  
• Increased	  military	  to	  military	  outreach	  to	  increase	  RSA	  naval	  capacity	  (could	  promote	  RSA’s	  willingness	  to	  join	  PSI)	  and	  help	  build	  confidence.	  
• On	  both	  sides	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  there	  are	  executive	  level	  workarounds	  in	  foreign	  policy	  and	  nonproliferation	  to	  get	  around	  institutional	  obstacles	  and	  that	  the	  countries	  should	  not	  limit	  their	  options.	  	  
• The	  United	  States	  should	  refrain	  from	  “othering”	  (employing	  us	  vs.	  them	  rhetoric),	  targeting	  South	  African	  diplomats	  at	  multilateral	  meetings	  for	  U.S.	  surveillance,	  and	  using	  carrots	  and	  sticks	  approaches	  to	  push	  through	  unilateral	  approaches.	  
Discussion	  Participants	  were	  divided	  into	  three	  groups	  dealing	  respectively	  with	  each	  pillar	  of	  the	  NPT.	  	  The	  group	  focusing	  on	  disarmament	  agreed	  that	  both	  states	  want	  to	  see	  a	  world	  free	  of	  nuclear	  weapons,	   but	   disagree	   on	   how	   to	   achieve	   this	   goal.	   The	   discussion	   highlighted	   that	   the	   United	  States	   will	   not	   unilaterally	   relinquish	   its	   nuclear	   weapons	   (unlike	   RSA).	   The	   South	   African	  participants	  emphasized	  that	  as	  long	  as	  nuclear	  weapons	  exist,	  they	  might	  be	  used	  with	  dire	  global	  humanitarian	   and	   economic	   consequences.	   Despite	   this	   disagreement,	   the	   group	   highlighted	   the	  change	  in	  tone	  from	  the	  Bush	  to	  the	  Obama	  administrations,	  encouraging	  presidential	  declarations,	  and	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  Obama	  administration	  has	  assembled	  a	  committed	   team	  to	  work	  on	  nuclear	  disarmament	   and	   nonproliferation	   (the	   group	   called	   it	   a	   “Dream	  Team”).	   Despite	   the	  welcoming	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these	  measures,	  the	  South	  African	  participants	  were	  keen	  to	  see	  the	  measures	  brought	  into	  the	  NPT	  linked	   multilateral	   forums,	   such	   as	   the	   Conference	   on	   Disarmament	   and	   the	   NPT	   RevCons.	   The	  discussion	  also	  highlighted	  the	  de	  facto	  NWS	  (India,	  Pakistan,	  North	  Korea,	  and	  Israel).	  The	  United	  States	  and	  RSA	  agree	  on	  North	  Korea,	  but	  disagree	  on	  the	  other	  countries,	  especially	  that	  U.S.	  allies	  of	  Israel	  and	  India	  seem	  to	  be	  treated	  differently.	  A	  point	  was	  made	  that	  nuclear	  weapons	  represent	  power	  and	  prestige	  and	  therefore	  disarmament	  is	  also	  about	  delegitimizing	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Civil	  society	  also	  plays	  an	  important	  role:	  during	  the	  Oslo	  Conference	  the	  humanitarian	  consequences	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  use	  were	  highlighted,	  especially	  by	  the	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  (ICRC).	  	  There	  was	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  differences	  on	  this	  issue	  could	  be	  greatly	  bridged	  if	  there	  were	  more	  trust	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  leading	  the	  group	  to	  argue	  that	  an	  accelerated	  confidence	  building	  process	   is	   needed.	   Building	   closer	   relations	   will	   also	   call	   for	   pragmatism	   from	   both	   states	   with	  respect	  to	  NWFZs	  (Middle	  East	  and	  Pelindaba).	  Participants	  questioned	  what	  “we”	  (academics)	  can	  do	  and	  provided	  suggestions	  such	  as	  building	  rapport	  among	  the	  academic	  community	  of	  experts,	  producing	   knowledge	   that	   reflects	   more	   nuanced	   insight	   of	   each	   countries’	   policies	   and	  motivations,	  and	  influencing	  governments	  (including	  legislatures	  and	  public	  opinion).	  In	  the	  nonproliferation	  group,	  both	  sides	  agreed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Africa	  have	  a	  shared	  interest	  in	  good	  outcome	  of	  2015	  NPT	  RevCon.	  The	  group	  discussed	  ways	  to	  achieve	  these	  goals	   and	   came	   concluded	   that	   keeping	   the	   focus	   on	   enhancing	   broad	   cooperation	   and	   making	  progress	   in	   international	   fora	   would	   be	   preferable	   to	   going	   into	   the	   details	   of	   nonproliferation	  issues	  where	   the	   differences	   can	   cause	   stalemate.	  More	   concrete	   cooperation	   in	   upcoming	   years	  could	   involve	   capacity	   building	   generally	   and	   specifically	   in	   governmental	   and	   regulatory	  institutions	   and	   cyber	   security,	   as	   well	   as	   through	   measures	   to	   build	   public	   confidence	   and	  understanding.	  This	  can	  be	  done	  through	  scientific	  and	  technical	  exchanges	  between	  South	  Africa	  and	  United	  States	  (e.g.	   lab-­‐to-­‐lab	  exchanges)	  and	  working	  together	  on	  verification	  and	  monitoring	  technology,	   i.e.	   proactive	   campaigns/initiatives.	   Along	   with	   this,	   the	   group	   thought	   there	   is	   a	  broader	   context	   for	   the	   cooperation	   avenues	   and	   that	   it	   might	   be	   productive	   to	   start	   with	   soft	  issues	  (e.g.	  developmental	  issues)	  to	  generate	  goodwill	  and	  a	  positive	  track	  record,	  smoothing	  the	  way	  to	  make	  greater	  progress	  on	  hard	  issues.	   In	  this	  respect,	   the	  United	  States	  was	  challenged	  to	  identify	  ways	  to	  help	  make	  the	  AFCONE	  a	  successful	  forum.	  The	  discussion	  also	   considered	  why	  South	  Africa	  has	  not	  yet	   joined	   the	  PSI.	  Engagement	  and	  cooperation	  on	  this	  issue	  will	  be	  difficult	  but	  it	  can	  be	  brought	  back	  to	  the	  table.	  Both	  sides	  agreed	  there	  are	  no	  principled	  or	  ideological	  objections	  to	  the	  initiatives,	  but	  the	  obstacle	  is	  the	  way	  it	  has	  been	   approached	   by	   the	  United	   States	   and	   capacity	   issues	  within	   the	   South	  African	   government.	  Therefore,	  PSI	  discussions	  should	  occur	  on	  their	  own,	  and	  not	  linked	  to	  principled	  issues	  that	  South	  Africa	  cannot	  agree	  to,	  due	  to	  its	  international	  constituency.	  Additionally,	  the	  United	  States	  needs	  to	  understand	  the	  significant	  capacity	  constraints	  that	  the	  South	  African	  government	  operates	  under;	  for	  some,	  the	  PSI	  has	  too	  many	  requirements	  that	  they	  cannot	  possibly	  fulfill,	  and	  this	  undermines	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support	   for	   inclusion.	   Finally,	   the	   South	   African	   side	   is	   sensitive	   to	   impression	   that	   PSI	   might	  impede	  RSA’s	  economic	  growth	  or	  sovereignty;	  therefore	  pressuring	  the	  government	  to	  join,	  which	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  infringement	  of	  its	  sovereignty	  or	  potential	  block	  to	  economic	  growth	  (nuclear	  energy),	  will	  generate	  resistance.	  	  The	  group	  thought	  that	  there	  is	  not	  much	  scope	  for	  progress	  on	  the	  intractable	  issues	  or	  issues	  of	   fundamental	   disagreement.	   However,	   suggestions	   were	   made	   that	   the	   United	   States	   should	  continue	  to	  support	  South	  African	  civil	  society	  and	  more	  Track	  1.5	  initiatives	  that	  can	  feed	  robust	  track	  one	  diplomacy.	  In	   the	   nuclear	   technology	   breakout	   group,	   the	   participants	   agreed	   that	   access	   to	   nuclear	  technology	   for	   peaceful	   purposes	   is	   an	   inalienable	   right	   if	   a	   state	   is	   an	   NPT	   member	   in	   full	  compliance.	  Different	  understandings	  of	  what	  an	   “inalienable	   right”	  means	   to	  each	   state,	   leads	   to	  disagreement.	  For	  example,	   the	  United	  States	  does	  not	   consider	   it	   an	  automatic	   right	  of	   states	   to	  engage	  in	  the	  entire	  process	  of	  nuclear	  material	  enrichment	  and	  reprocessing	  because	  technology	  for	   LEU	   can	   be	   adapted	   to	  make	   HEU.	   For	   the	   United	   States,	   this	  means	   that	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	  guarantee	  complete	   transparency	  where	  a	  number	  of	  openings	  exist,	  and	  this	  can	  easily	   lead	  to	  a	  proliferation	   risk	   –	   evidenced	   by	   suspicions	   about	   Iran’s	   energy	   program	   and	   Brazil	   and	   Turkey	  retaining	   the	   capabilities.	   Therefore,	   the	   United	   States	   favors	   fuel	   banks	   (consolidated	   HEU	  production	  and	  storage)	  to	  prevent	  proliferation.	  The	  South	  Africans	  were	  critical	  of	  U.S.	  acceptance	  of	   Germany,	   Japan,	   and	   South	   Korea,	   but	   not	   South	   Africa,	   as	   states	   trusted	   to	   enrich	   uranium.	  Despite	  the	  material	  benefits	  of	  part-­‐taking	  in	  both	  the	  domestic	  and	  international	  nuclear	  industry,	  this	  denies	  South	  Africa	  both	  the	  material	  and	  intangible	  benefits	  of	  reputation	  previously	  afforded.	  In	   extreme	   cases,	   some	   argue	   that	   this	   is	   an	   example	   of	   the	  West	   trying	   to	   stymie	   the	   economic	  grow	  of	  “the	  rest.”	  Furthermore,	  the	  United	  States	  regards	  RSA’s	  stock	  of	  HEU	  as	  a	  concern	  and	  would	  like	  to	  see	  it	  diluted	   or	   handed	   over.	   Conversely,	   the	   South	   African	   government	   considers	   the	   stockpile	   a	  strategic	  resource	  and	  is	  unlikely	  to	  accede	  to	  these	  wishes.	  Additionally,	  South	  African	  aspirations	  to	  regain	  the	  full	  nuclear	  fuel	  cycle	  are	  linked	  to	  conceptions	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  economic	  growth.	  The	   United	   States	   instead	   focuses	   on	   the	   potential	   proliferation	   risk:	   if	   it	   re-­‐acquires	   this	  technology,	  South	  Africa	  could	  be	  pulled	  or	  pushed	  into	  providing	  nuclear	  material	  to	  proliferators.	  Given	  RSA’s	  record,	  the	  South	  Africans	  regard	  this	  distrust	  as	  a	  non-­‐proliferator	  to	  be	  an	  insult	  to	  the	  country.	  	  SA	  also	  expects	  rewards	  when	  it	  “proliferation-­‐proofs”	  its	  facilities.	  One	  example	  was	  when	  RSA	  converted	   its	   SAFARI-­‐1	   reactor	   to	   LEU	   and	   developed	   technology	   that	   used	   LEU	   for	   the	  manufacturing	  of	  medical	  isotopes.	  The	  continuing	  distrust	  of	  South	  Africa	  is	  more	  problematic	  as	  its	  competitors	  still	  use	  HEU	  and	  have	  not	  incurred	  the	  same	  costs	  to	  their	  economies.	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Session	  Seven:	  Defining	  the	  Ideal	  Relationship	  between	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  United	  States	  
In	   this	   session,	  we	   sought	   to	   forge	   a	   path	   forward	  with	   respect	   to	   U.S.-­‐South	   Africa	   relations.	  What	   should	   or	   could	   be	   the	   ideal	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   countries?	   How	   can	   we	   use	  dialogues	   like	   this	   effort	   to	   improve	   the	   U.S.-­‐RSA	   relationship?	   In	   this	   panel,	   the	   two	   speakers	  focused	   at	   the	   30,000-­‐foot	   level	   and	   more	   concrete	   levels.	   In	   the	   more	   general	   presentations,	  discussion	   focused	  on	  how,	  based	   from	   the	   common	  perspective	  of	   shared	  values	   and	   ideals,	   the	  U.S.-­‐South	   Africa	   bilateral	   relationship	   should	   be	   as	   close	   as	   that	   between	   the	   United	   States	   and	  Australia	   or	   New	   Zealand.	   In	   reality,	   however,	   the	   current	   official	   relationship	   lacks	   warmth,	   is	  often	  “edgy,”	  and	  remains	  underdeveloped.	  On	  both	  sides	  the	  relationship	  is	  distorted	  by	  suspicion	  and	   disappointments	   with	   historical	   roots.	   Nuclear	   issues	   could	   provide	   an	   avenue	   to	   generate	  closer	  relations,	  due	  to	  South	  Africa’s	  unique	  credibility	  on	  disarmament.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  end	  of	  apartheid,	  Americans	  had	  anticipated	  that	  South	  Africa	  would	  lead	  the	  continent	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  Western	  values,	  be	  an	  engine	  of	  growth	  for	  the	  African	  continent,	  and	   a	   force	   in	   the	   developing	  world	   for	   democracy	   and	   human	   rights.	   Instead,	   because	   of	   South	  Africa’s	   diplomatic	   orientation	   toward	   the	   South	   and	   the	   non-­‐aligned,	  many	   in	   the	  United	   States	  Government	  (USG)	  feel	  that	  South	  Africa	  has	  not	  upheld	  what	  they	  consider	  to	  be	  “universal”	  ideals	  of	   human	   rights	   and	   democracy	   in	   several	   key	   instances	   (Zimbabwe	   being	   a	   prime	   example).	  Additionally,	   a	   sub-­‐stream	   of	   the	   political	   rhetoric	   and	   symbols	   used	   by	   successive	   ANC	  administrations	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  commitment	  to	  non-­‐racial	  democracy.	  On	   the	   other	   side,	   South	   Africans	   had	   anticipated	   massive	   inflows	   of	   Western	   –	   especially	  American	  –aid	  after	  1994	  and	  had	  expected	  that	  this	  investment	  that	  would	  transform	  the	  economy	  and	  lives	  of	  the	  majority	  living	  in	  poverty.	  When	  massive	  aid	  and	  investment	  inflows	  did	  not	  arrive,	  Pretoria	  began	  to	  question	  the	  American	  commitment	  to	  post-­‐apartheid	  South	  Africa.	  Feeding	  those	  suspicions	  was	  liberation	  movement	  memory	  of	  Washington	  cooperating	  closely	  with	  the	  apartheid	  regime	  on	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Pretoria	  also	  remains	  sensitive	  to	  instances	  of	  American	  “unilateralism”	  which	  it	  sees	  manifested	  in	  military	  intervention	  in	  Libya,	  Washington’s	  reluctance	  to	   defer	   to	   South	   African	   leadership	   in	   Africa,	   and	   its	   reluctance	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	   non-­‐aligned	  perspective.	  An	   ideal	   relationship	  would	   be	   that	   of	   a	   partnership	   between	   two	   democracies	   devoid	   of	   the	  current	  climate	  of	   suspicion	  and	  disappointment.	  As	   the	  many	  discussions	   in	   this	  workshop	  have	  demonstrated,	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  confluence	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  South	  African	  positions	  on	  nuclear	  energy	  and	  nonproliferation	  issues.	  Working	  these	  commonalities	  can	  hold	  potential	  for	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  broader	  relationship	  between	  the	  countries,	  and	  build	  a	  reservoir	  of	  goodwill	  and	  understanding	   that	  might	   lead	   to	  progress	   on	  bridging	   the	  differences.	  Rather	   than	   creating	  new	  structures	   for	   this	  dialogue,	  both	  countries	  could	  make	  greater	  use	  of	   their	   respective	  embassies,	  augmented	  by	  experts	  when	  required.	  Unofficial	  efforts,	  dialogues,	  and	  exchanges	  can	  also	  go	  a	  long	  way	  to	  overcoming	  suspicion	  and	  disappointment	  if	  participants	  are	  close	  to,	  but	  not	  part	  of,	  their	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respective	   governments.	   There	   is	   also	   a	   role	   for	   international	   nuclear	   agencies.	   An	   improved	  bilateral	  relationship	  will	  be	  about	  people,	  communications,	  and	  better	  mutual	  understanding,	  not	  new	  bureaucratic	  structures.	  Nuclear	  issues	  can	  provide	  a	  point	  of	  entry	  to	  improved	  dialogue	  that	  could	  facilitate	  a	  closer	  bilateral	  relationship.	  	  Forging	  a	  relationship	  based	  on	  nuclear	  and	  nonproliferation	  issues	  is	  not	  a	  panacea,	  however.	  Moving	   below	   the	   level	   of	   grand	   international	   relations,	   and	   more	   concretely	   considering	   the	  nonproliferation	   and	  nuclear	   energy	   realms,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   reflect	   on	   the	  historical	   context	   of	  this	  relationship.	  South	  Africa’s	  strong	  support	  for	  nuclear	  disarmament	  and	  its	  critical	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   U.S.	   policies	   and	   nuclear	   doctrine,	   its	   unique	   nuclear	   related	   relationship	   with	   the	   United	  States,	  as	  well	  as	   its	  role	  as	   “bridge	  builder”	  between	  the	  nuclear	  weapons	  states	  on	   the	  one	  side	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  NNWS	  (as	  represented	  by	  the	  NAM)	  on	  the	  other,	  all	  impose	  constraints	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  with	  the	  RSA	  and	  USA	  will	  ever	  align	  perspectives	  on	  nuclear	  and	  nonproliferation	  issues.	  	  There	  remains	  a	  deep	  dividing	  line	  between	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  United	  States	  regarding	  their	  divergent	  approaches	  to	  national,	  regional,	  and	  global	  security.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  its	  NATO	  and	  other	   strategic	   allies	   consider	   nuclear	  weapons	   to	   be	   fundamental	   in	   their	   defense	   strategies.	   In	  contrast,	   South	   Africa	   holds	   that	   the	   development	   of	   new	   types	   of	   nuclear	   weapons	   or	   the	  rationalization	   of	   their	   use	   contradicts	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   NPT	   and	   its	   RevCons.	   South	   Africa	  fundamentally	  holds	  that	  its	  national	  security	  -­‐	  and	  the	  security	  of	  the	  African	  region	  -­‐	  is	  guaranteed	  by	  a	  strong	  NPT	  and	  not	  by	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Therefore,	  the	  South	  Africa	  of	  today	  firmly	  believes	  that	   possession	   of	   nuclear	   weapons	   provides	   only	   an	   illusion	   of	   security	   for	   those	   who	   possess	  them,	   but	   in	   reality	   such	   possession	   only	   serves	   to	   increase	   insecurity.	   These	   different	   postures	  reflect	   important	   fundamental	  difference	   in	  approach	  between	  the	  two	  governments:	  while	  South	  Africa’s	  nonproliferation	  policy	  is	  one	  of	  principle,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  consider	  matters	  of	  nonproliferation,	  arms	  control,	  and	  disarmament	  from	  a	  national	  security	  perspective.	  Nonetheless,	  a	  strong	  dialogue	  between	  the	  two	  governments	  continues	  to	  exist	  on	  a	  number	  of	  key	  issues,	  and	  there	  is	  also	  a	  mutual	  understanding	  on	  some	  of	  the	  limitations	  by	  each	  government	  to	  further	  enhance	  cooperation.	  South	  Africa’s	  principled	  position	  on	  nuclear	  disarmament	  and	  the	  unequivocal	   right	   to	   nuclear	   energy	   and	   technology	   for	   peaceful	   purposes	   remain	   the	   guiding	  principles	   in	   its	   relationship	  with	   the	  United	  States	  on	   these	  matters.	  American	  expectations	   that	  South	   Africa	  will	   continue	   to	   bring	   about	  miracles	   by	   rallying	   the	   NAM	   behind	   key	   compromise	  positions	  in	  response	  to	  some	  of	  the	  most	  challenging	  issues	  on	  the	  nonproliferation	  agenda,	  as	  it	  previously	  did	   in	  1995	  and	  2000,	   can	   strain	   the	   limits	  of	   this	   cooperation.	  An	   important	  element	  that	  is	  often	  overlooked	  by	  the	  United	  States	  is	  the	  limited	  resources	  available	  to	  South	  Africa	  for	  it	  to	   (1)	   be	   a	   bridge	   builder	   on	   some	   of	   the	   most	   dividing	   issues,	   or	   (2)	   conform	   to	   standards	   as	  defined	  by	  the	  United	  States.	   If	   the	  United	  States	  would	  reduce	  both	  expectations,	   it	  could	  help	  to	  improve	  some	  of	  the	  tensions	  noted	  above.	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Formal	  mechanisms	   like	   the	  bi-­‐annual	   strategic	  dialogue	  between	  South	  Africa	  and	   the	  United	  States	   to	   discuss	   issues	   and	  matters	   related	   to	  WMD	   related	   nonproliferation,	   disarmament,	   and	  arms	   control,	   as	  well	   as	  nuclear	   energy	   cooperation,	   initiated	   in	  1995	  and	   re-­‐initiated	   in	   the	   late	  2000s,	   are	   important	  mechanisms	   through	  which	   the	   two	   countries	   can	   pursue	   the	   relationship	  between	   them.	   Initially	   established	   in	   the	   late	   1990s	   between	   Mbeki	   and	   Gore,	   the	   dialogue	  between	   the	   two	   governments	   was	   not	   only	   based	   on	   a	   formal	  mechanism,	   but	   an	   open	   line	   of	  communication	  that	  existed	  between	  senior	  officials.	  This	  mechanism	  broke	  down	  during	  the	  Bush	  administration,	  and	  was	  re-­‐initiated	  by	   then-­‐Secretary	  of	  State	  Hillary	  Clinton	   in	  2009	  as	   the	  U.S.	  South	  Africa	  Nonproliferation	  and	  Disarmament	  Dialogue.	  Continued	   informal	  dialogue,	  based	  on	  mutual	   respect	   and	   often	   interpersonal	   relationships,	   will	   prove	   to	   enhance	   understanding	   and	  cooperation	  alongside	   the	  more	   infrequent	   formal	  mechanism.	  Nonetheless,	  due	   to	   the	  actions	  of	  the	  United	  States	  during	   the	  apartheid	  era	  and	   immediately	   following,	  deep	  suspicion	   remains	   in	  South	  African	   government	   circles	   about	  U.S.	   intentions	   and	   commitments.	  This	  has	  been	  brought	  into	   the	   current	   era	   because	   important	   components	   of	   the	   South	   African	   government	   consider	  South	  Africa’s	  support	  for	  the	  indefinite	  extension	  of	  the	  NPT	  a	  mistake,	  especially	  since	  none	  of	  the	  concrete	   promises	   made	   by	   the	   United	   States	   to	   South	   Africa	   at	   the	   time	   have	   been	   met.	   This	  continues	   to	   generate	   distrust	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   South	   African	   government	   towards	   any	   closer	  collaboration	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  goals	  in	  this	  realm.	  	  Despite	  mistrust	  on	  both	  sides,	  the	  nonproliferation	  and	  disarmament	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  is	  not	  based	  on	  a	  “checklist	  approach”	  to	  evaluate	  the	  level	  of	  agreement	  or	  disagreement	  over	  issues.	   Instead,	   the	   two	   governments	   already	   closely	   cooperate	   on	   a	   number	   of	   practical	  nonproliferation	  issues,	   in	  particular	   in	  the	  areas	  of	   law	  enforcement	  and	  joint	   investigations	  into	  export	  control	  concerns,	  strengthening	  of	  the	  NSG	  and	  Missile	  Technology	  Control	  Regime	  (MTCR),	  implementation	   of	   UNSCR	   1540,	   and	   other	   areas.	   This	   forms	   the	   basis	   of	   continued	   practical	  engagement	  even	  when	  the	  diplomatic	  and	  political	  rhetoric	  becomes	  less	  than	  warm.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   continued	   lack	   of	   acknowledgement	   by	   the	   current	   and	   future	   U.S.	   governments	   of	   South	  Africa’s	  principled	  positions	  as	   legitimate	  policies	  and	  not	  as	  obstinate	  opposition	  to	  U.S.	  national	  security	   interests,	   could	   over	   time	   erode	   the	   nonproliferation	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	  countries.	  Once	  again,	  the	  speakers	  on	  this	  panel	  reiterated	  that	  the	  United	  States	  needs	  to	  understand	  that	  there	   is	   a	   critical	   lack	   of	   capacity	   in	   the	   South	   African	   government:	   it	   simply	   does	   not	   have	   the	  personnel	  within	  DIRCO	  to	  accede	  to	  all	  of	  the	  initiatives	  that	  the	  U.S.	  pressures	  South	  Africa	  to	  sign,	  such	  as	  PSI.	  On	  the	  U.S.	  side,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  assume	  that	  “non-­‐compliance”	  –	  a	  term	  rejected	  by	  South	  Africans	  –	  stems	  from	  opposition	  to	  the	  initiatives,	  when	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  personnel	  to	  comply	  with	  all	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  initiatives.	  	  There	   are	   also	   several	   “irritating”	   factors	   impeding	   the	   creation	   of	   stronger	   relationships	  between	  the	  USA	  and	  RSA.	  They	  include	  the	  continued	  lack	  of	  progress	  in	  the	  United	  States	  towards	  ratification	   of	   the	   CTBT;	  moving	   the	   goal	   posts	   in	   areas	   such	   as	   fissile	  material	   control,	   both	   in	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terms	   of	   military	   and	   civilian	   uses;	   and	   re-­‐defining	   the	   “unequivocal	   right”	   to	   peaceful	   uses	   of	  nuclear	  energy	  and	  technologies	  for	  peaceful	  uses.	  The	  last	  factor	  has	  been	  a	  strong	  driving	  force	  in	  an	  increasingly	  suspicious	  South	  African	  view	  of	  U.S.	   intentions	  in	  the	  NSG,	  NPT	  RevCons,	  Nuclear	  Security	   Summits,	   etc.	   A	   particularly	   thorny	   irritant	   is	   continued	   U.S.-­‐driven	   efforts	   to	   eliminate	  HEU	   in	  civilian	  stockpiles,	   including	   the	  remnants	  of	   the	  South	  Africa’s	   former	  weapons	  program.	  South	  Africa	  considers	   its	  HEU	  stockpile	  a	  strategic	  national	  asset	  and	  it	   is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  reduced	  significantly	   in	   the	   near	   term	   due	   to	   two	  main	   considerations:	   (i)	   the	   stockpile	   has	   a	   significant	  commercial	  value,	  and	  (ii)	  it	  serves	  to	  provide	  political	  leverage	  in	  support	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  nuclear	  disarmament	  objectives.	  Finally,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  relationship	  with	  third	  party	  nations,	  as	  well	  the	  broader	  political	   dynamics	   between	   the	   various	   political	   and	   regional	   groupings	   that	   typically	   put	   South	  Africa	  and	   the	  United	  States	   in	  opposing	  camps.	  Much	  has	  already	  been	  said	  about	  South	  Africa’s	  relationship	  with	   key	   historical	   political	   partners,	   including	   Iran	   and	   India.	   South	  Africa’s	   role	   in	  IBSA	  and	  BRICS	  are	  important	  factors	  in	  determining	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  While	  U.S.	  nonproliferation	  objectives	  have	  in	  the	  past	  played	  a	  dominant	  role	  in	  shaping	  many	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  own	  policies,	  this	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  the	  case.	  On	  a	  more	  optimistic	  note,	  all	   this	  may	  change	  with	  the	  next	  generation.	  Education	  remains	  an	  important	   tool	   to	   advance	   the	   nonproliferation	   and	   disarmament	   objectives	   that	   are	   shared	   by	  South	  Africa	   and	   the	  United	   States.	   Future	   track	   two	   dialogues,	   similar	   to	   this	  workshop,	   should	  also	  explore	  how	  academic	   institutions	  and	  governments	  can	  collaborate	  to	  develop	  and	  promote	  disarmament	  and	  nonproliferation	  education.	  
Discussion	  The	  discussion	   in	  this	  session	  focused	  a	  great	  deal	  on	  the	  different	  outlooks	  and	  orientation	  of	  the	   United	   States	   and	   South	   Africa:	   pragmatic	   vs.	   principled.	   Many	   focused	   on	   how	   to	   deepen	   a	  cordial	   relationship	   into	   something	  more	   substantial,	   and	   related	   to	   this,	   whether	   it	   is	   in	   South	  Africa’s	   interest	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  USA	  and	  RSA	  have	  very	  different	  constituencies	  in	  the	  international	  realm,	  and	  South	  Africa	  could	  risk	  alienating	   its	  constituencies	   in	  IBSA,	  NAM,	  and	  BRICS	  should	   it	  draw	  closer	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  South	  African	  government	  cannot	  be	  viewed	  a	  “stooge”	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Therefore,	   the	  United	  States	  can	  hope	  to	  generate	  closer	  ties	  with	  South	  Africa,	  but	  there	  are	   limits.	  There	  is	  a	  strategic	   imperative	  for	  the	  South	  Africans	  to	  maintain	  public	  distance	  even	  when	  in	  reality	  the	  relationships	  can	  become	  close	  at	  a	  working	  level.	  	  U.S.	  rhetoric	  claims	  that	   it	  desires	  a	  closer	  relationship,	  but	  the	  realities	  of	   the	  relationship	  are	  difficult	  to	  overcome.	  One	  participant	  suggested	  that	  the	  United	  States	  must	  support	  South	  Africa’s	  African	   agenda	   by	   desecuritizing.	   Another	   participant	   suggested	   that	   if	   the	   United	   States	   cannot	  deliver	  on	  economic	  and	  trade	  issues,	  it	  will	  turn	  to	  the	  growing	  position	  of	  China.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  future	   of	   U.S.-­‐South	   African	   relations,	   the	   comparison	   was	   made	   to	   the	   U.S.-­‐India	   relationship.	  Although	   the	  United	  States	  has	   retained	   its	  decades-­‐long	  position	  of	  power,	   it	  has	  grown	   to	  view	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India	   as	   an	   emerging	  middle	   power	   and	   regional	   hegemon.	   Instead	   of	   viewing	   South	  Africa	  with	  suspicion,	  it	  should	  help	  cultivate	  this	  leadership	  role.	  A	   second	  main	   point	   of	   discussion	   focused	   on	   the	  U.S.	   assumption	   of	   the	   role	   of	   international	  policeman,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  sympathy	  within	  the	  United	  States	  for	  the	  problems	  it	  brings	  upon	  itself	  when	  assuming	   this	   role.	  While	   the	  South	  Africans	   in	   the	  room	  recognized	  why	   the	  United	  States	  acts	  as	  the	  global	  policeman,	  and	  agree	  that	  at	  times	  this	  was	  necessary,	  they	  also	  felt	  that	  military	  and	  other	  force-­‐based	  options	  should	  never	  be	  used	  until	  all	  other	  avenues	  have	  been	  thoroughly	  exhausted.	  In	  this	  context,	  there	  was	  much	  discussion	  of	  the	  current	  (at	  the	  time	  the	  workshop	  took	  place	   and	   the	   report	  was	  written)	   situation	   in	   Syria,	  where	   the	   U.S.	   Congress	   has	   been	   debating	  President	  Obama’s	   request	   to	   use	   force	   against	   the	  Assad	   regime,	  while	   the	  Russian	   government	  was	  attempting	  to	  forge	  a	  diplomatic	  way	  out.	  	  
Session	  Eight:	  Roundtable	  Discussion	  to	  Shape	  Future	  U.S.-­‐South	  Africa	  Track	  Two	  Dialogues	  
The	   workshop	   concluded	   with	   a	   roundtable	   discussion	   to	   isolate	   key	   points	   and	   raise	  suggestions	  for	  future	  U.S.-­‐South	  Africa	  track	  two	  dialogues.	  Participants	  valued	  the	  track	  two	  arena	  of	   honest	   interactions	   and	   appreciated	   the	   high	   level	   of	   subject	   matter	   expert	   interaction.	   The	  discussion	  began	  at	  the	  debate	  level	  with	  significant	  academic	  analysis	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  collective	  knowledge.	  To	  continue	  to	  foster	  a	  frank	  and	  academic	  environment	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  RSA	  in	  the	  future,	  all	  participants	  must	  be	  treated	  as	  equal	  partners	  and	  not	  treat	  the	  relationship	  asymmetrically.	  	  Attendees	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   involving	   legislators	   from	   both	   the	   U.S.	   Congress	   and	  South	   African	   Parliament.	   It	   was	   also	   raised	   that	   it	   would	   be	   particularly	   useful	   to	   involve	  government	   and	   private	   sector	   practitioners	   tangibly	   involved	   in	   policy	   formulation	   and	  implementation.	   While	   interdisciplinary	   partners	   of	   functionalists	   and	   academics	   can	   provide	  contributions,	   policymakers	   can	   recommend	   changes.	   Also,	   it	   is	   important	   for	   the	   government	  representatives	  to	  provide	   insight	  and	  viewpoints	   into	  their	  government’s	  policies.	  Particularly	   in	  South	  Africa,	  nuclear	  issues	  are	  generally	  fragmented	  across	  the	  defense	  and	  DIRCO	  committees;	  a	  caucus	  on	  nuclear	  issues	  would	  centralize	  and	  inform	  these	  disparate	  groups.	  	  For	   the	   future,	   it	   would	   be	   important	   to	   include	   a	   broad	   cross-­‐section	   of	   South	   African	  participants.	   As	   this	   was	   an	   initial,	   pilot	   workshop,	   the	   size	   of	   the	   group	   was	   kept	   small.	   All	  attendees	   were	   people	   with	   track	   records	   specifically	   in	   nuclear	   weapons,	   nonproliferation,	   or	  international	   relations.	   Most	   participants	   were	   academics	   or	   government-­‐employed	   academics.	  Greater	   involvement	  with	  NGOs	  and	   think	   tanks	   could	   leverage	   the	  dialogue	  process	   as	   a	  way	   to	  build	   new	   networks.	   Another	   avenue	   to	   shape	   policy	   and	   create	   an	   enlarged	   vision	   would	   be	   a	  separate	  or	   follow-­‐on	  effort	   to	   include	   the	  AU,	   SADC,	  or	   regional	   actors.	  Discussion	  could	  also	  be	  opened	   to	   a	  more	   demographically	   diverse	   range	   of	   South	   African	   and	   American	   subject	  matter	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experts	  on	  other	  types	  of	  WMDs.17	  Yet	  while	  expanded	  participation	  is	  desirable,	   limited	  research	  and	   travel	   funding	   is	   a	   genuine	   issue	   for	   South	   African	   capacity	   building.	   To	   cultivate	   the	  relationships	   and	   networks	   established	   at	   the	   dialogue,	   a	   low-­‐cost	   solution	   recommended	  was	   a	  mailing	  list	  or	  regular	  forum	  through	  e-­‐mail	  or	  the	  internet	  to	  disseminate	  scholarship.	  	  Several	   participants	   raised	   concern	   over	   a	   lost	   generation	   of	   South	  African	   nuclear	   scientists	  and	  experts,	   and	   the	   chasm	  between	   the	   two	  worlds.	  Participants	   affirmed	   the	  utility	   in	  bringing	  together	   nuclear	   scientists	   and	   political	   scientists	   so	   both	   jointly	   understand	   the	   technical	   and	  policy	  side	  of	  the	  issues.	  To	  bridge	  that	  gap,	  students	  could	  be	  utilized	  as	  emerging	  representatives	  of	   the	   new	   generation	   to	   cultivate	   knowledge	   through	   participation.	   This	   is	   a	   constructive	  investment	   in	   the	   future	   because	   the	   student	   can	   observe	   and	   learn	   the	   language,	   terms,	   and	  process	   surrounding	   nuclear	   policy.	   Capacity	   should	   not	   begin	   after	   a	   government	   career	   has	  begun;	  instead,	  it	  should	  start	  in	  universities.	  Historically,	  South	  African	  students	  are	  not	  interested	  in	   pursuing	   a	   career	   in	   international	   relations	   or	   security	   studies,	   and	   these	   initiatives	   could	  generate	  greater	  interest.	  However,	  students	  are	  not	  a	  guaranteed	  capacity-­‐building	  apparatus	  and	  track	  two	  and	  1.5	  negotiations	  are	  a	  trusted	  vehicle	  to	  build	  networks	  and	  knowledge.	  	  In	   the	   future,	   there	   should	   be	  more	   focused	   representation	   of	   both	   governments’	   policies	   by	  raising	   lexicon	   issues	  and	  challenging	  key	  assumptions.	  Even	  though	  all	  participants	  are	  speaking	  the	   same	   language,	   discussions	   should	   focus	   on	   lexicon	   issues	   so	   all	   participants	   understand	   the	  connotations	  for	  each	  term	  to	  erase	  perceived	  grievances.	  Furthermore,	  key	  assumptions	  should	  be	  challenged	   to	  gain	   further	  depth	  on	  core	   issues:	  an	  example	   for	   the	  South	  African	  view	   is	   that	  all	  nuclear	   weapons	   are	   equally	   undesirable.	   From	   the	   U.S.	   perspective,	   an	   assumption	   that	   can	   be	  challenged	  in	  the	  future	  is	  the	  legitimacy	  lent	  to	  some	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  provide	  deterrence	  value.	  	  Alternative	   locations	  were	  suggested	   to	   strengthen	  participation	  and	  representation	   in	   future	  events.	  The	   inaugural	  dialogue	  was	  hosted	   in	  South	  Africa	   in	  order	  to	  attract	   local	  academics	  and	  government	   officials	   with	   limited	   travel	   funds,	   and	   Pretoria	   was	   selected	   in	   order	   to	   lower	   in-­‐country	   conference	   costs.	   For	   future	   dialogues,	   Cape	   Town	   could	   be	   desirable	   to	   increase	   the	  involvement	  of	  the	  South	  African	  parliamentarians.	  A	  location	  in	  the	  United	  States	  was	  also	  viewed	  as	  desirable	  because	   there	   is	   a	  bigger	   constituency	  of	  American	  policymakers	  and	  subject	  matter	  experts	  on	  nuclear	  issues.	  Another	  option	  is	  a	  neutral	  third	  country.	  	  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE DIALOGUES The	   participants	   made	   several	   constructive	   recommendations	   and	   suggestions	   to	   enhance	  future	  workshops	  on	  nuclear	  issues.	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  While	  some	  raised	  this	  point	  as	  a	  criticism,	  others	  noted	  that	  the	  demographic	  profile	  of	  the	  community	  of	  experts	  on	  these	  issues	  in	  both	  countries	  is	  nether	  gender	  nor	  racially	  diverse.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  side	  discussion	  about	  promoting	  educational	  initiatives	  to	  change	  this	  aspect,	  in	  both	  countries.	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First,	   participants	   highlighted	   the	   benefits	   of	   expanding	   participation	   to	   new	   interest	   groups	  and	  reengaging	  traditional	  stakeholders.	  There	  are	  many	  advantages	  to	  expanding	  the	  discussion	  to	  include	   emerging	   scholars,	   a	   wider	   cross-­‐section	   of	   U.S.	   and	   South	   African	   academics,	   the	  interdisciplinary	  level,	  and	  other	  relevant	  communities	  outside	  of	  academia.	  Also,	  there	  was	  some	  interest	  in	  expanding	  the	  workshop	  to	  a	  track	  1.5	  and	  inviting	  government	  officials	  to	  speak	  in	  their	  unofficial	  capacities.	  To	  encompass	  such	  a	  wide-­‐range	  of	  people	  in	  academia,	  government,	  and	  the	  scientific	  community,	  the	  capacity	  has	  to	  be	  grown	  and	  fostered	  within	  South	  Africa:	  	  
• Within	  academia	  –	  capacity	  building	   to	  generate	  a	  more	  specialized	   field	  of	  academics	  within	   South	   Africa.	   Several	   noted	   that	   no	   institutions	   of	   higher	   education	   in	   South	  Africa	  offer	  a	  degree	  in	  nonproliferation	  studies,	  and	  few	  scholars	  specialize	  in	  the	  field.	  	  
• Within	  scientific	  community	  –	  to	  generate	  a	  stronger	  community	  of	   interest	  outside	  of	  government	   to	   counter	   the	   industrial	   lobby	   groups	   that	   push	   for	   expanding	   nuclear	  technologies.	  This	  community	  should	  engage	  in	  sophisticated	  discussion	  and	  potentially	  educate	  the	  public	  about	  the	  issues.	  	  
• Amongst	   the	  next	  generation	  of	  South	  African	  students	  –	   to	  create	  a	  greater	  supply	  of	  public	  officials	  and	  scholars	  engaged	  in	  these	  matters.	  	  Other	   recommendations	   focused	   on	   the	   content	   of	   the	   workshop.	   One	   participant	  recommended	   increasing	   the	   level	   of	   specialization	   so	   there	   is	   more	   focus	   on	   specific	   areas	   of	  government	   policy.	   This	   is	   particularly	   important	   for	   South	   Africa	   since	   the	   academics	   and	  policymakers	   concentrating	   on	   nuclear	   issues	   rarely	   meet	   together	   due	   to	   lack	   of	   capacity	   and	  lower	  prioritization.	  In	   the	   future,	   the	   workshop	   facilitators	   aim	   to	   engage	   with	   embassy	   officials	   and	   USG	  stakeholders	  at	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  workshop	  formulation.	  Closer	  collaboration	  will	  allow	  for	  the	  workshop	  to	  augment	  and	  strengthen	  existing	  initiatives.	  Future	  workshops	  could	  also	  benefit	  from	  a	  preparatory	   trip	   to	   the	  U.S.	  Embassy	   in	   South	  Africa	  or	  be	  hosted	  at	   alternative	   sites	  within	  or	  outside	  of	  South	  Africa.	  Also,	  future	  workshops	  could	  expand	  beyond	  the	  dialogue	  focus	  and	  include	  academic	  or	  student	  exchanges.	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ACRONYMS ABACC	  –	  Brazilian–Argentine	  Agency	  for	  Accounting	  and	  Control	  of	  Nuclear	  Materials	  AFCONE	  –	  African	  Commission	  on	  Nuclear	  Energy	  AFNWFZ	  –	  African	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  Free	  Zone	  AFRICOM	  –	  United	  States	  Africa	  Command	  ANC	  –	  African	  National	  Congress	  AP	  –	  Additional	  Protocol	  AU	  –	  African	  Union	  BRIC	  -­‐	  Brazil,	  India,	  and	  China	  BRICS	  –	  Brazil,	  India,	  China,	  and	  South	  Africa	  BWC	  -­‐	  Biological	  Warfare	  Convention	  CANE	  –	  Coalition	  against	  Nuclear	  Energy	  	  CTBT	  –	  Comprehensive	  Nuclear-­‐Test	  Ban	  Treaty	  CTBTO	  –	  Comprehensive	  Nuclear-­‐Test	  Ban	  Treaty	  Organization	  CWC	  -­‐	  Chemical	  Warfare	  Convention	  	  DIRCO	  –	  South	  African	  Department	  of	  International	  Relations	  and	  Cooperation	  DoD	  –	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense	  	  EMG	  –	  Environmental	  Monitoring	  Group	  	  FMCT	  –	  Fissile	  Material	  Cutoff	  Treaty	  FMT	  –	  Fissile	  Material	  Treaty	  G20	  –	  Group	  of	  Twenty	  HEU	  –	  Highly	  Enriched	  Uranium	  IAEA	  –	  International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Association	  ICRC	  –	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  INSEP	  –	  International	  Nuclear	  Safeguards	  and	  Engagement	  Program	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IBSA	  –	  India,	  Brazil,	  and	  South	  Africa	  LEU	  –	  Low	  Enriched	  Uranium	  MENWFZ	  –	  Middle	  East	  Nuclear	  Free	  Weapons	  Zone	  MTCR	  –	  Missile	  Technology	  Control	  Regime	  NAM	  –	  Non-­‐Aligned	  Movement	  NNWS	  -­‐	  Non-­‐Nuclear	  Weapons	  States	  	  NWS	  –	  Nuclear	  Weapon	  States	  NPT	  –	  Nonproliferation	  Treaty	  NPR	  –	  Nuclear	  Posture	  Review	  NSG	  –	  Nuclear	  Suppliers	  Group	  	  NWFZs	  –	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  Free	  Zones	  	  P5	  –	  Permanent	  Members	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  PNS	  –	  Partnership	  for	  Nuclear	  Security	  PSI	  –	  Proliferation	  Security	  Initiative	  RevCon	  –	  Review	  Conference	  (of	  the	  NPT)	  R2P	  –	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  RSA	  –	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa	  SADC	  –	  Southern	  African	  Development	  Community	  UNODA	  –	  United	  Nations	  Office	  for	  Disarmament	  Affairs	  UNSC	  –	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  UNSCR	  –	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  USA	  –	  United	  States	  of	  America	  USAID	  –	  U.S.	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development	  USG	  –	  United	  States	  Government	  WMD	  –	  Weapons	  of	  Mass	  Destruction	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   generated	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  interest	   in	  seeing	  it	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